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Preface 
The concept of an acceptable risk is an integral part of modern society. However, 
when we attempt to determine what an acceptable risk is in a particular situation, we 
have to consider questions such as 'to whom is the risk acceptable?' and 'where are the 
likely costs (risks) and benefits likely to fall?'. People's perceptions of risk are an 
important factor when determining a level of risk (or safety) for a particular activity 
such as the location of a chemical plant, the building of a bridge, effluent disposal in 
waterways, hydro fluorocarbon use and the many other hazardous activities that are 
integral parts of our current way of life. 
Risks are not new to society. Many risk levels have been reduced considerably as a 
result of increased technical and scientific knowledge. However, people's perceptions 
of risk and their tolerance of risk have changed significantly in the past 20-30 years as 
greater publicity has been given to aspects of risk and failures of technical systems. 
The expert's credibility has been threatened by incidents and disasters such as Three 
Mile Island, Flixborough, Windscale and Bhopal. As a result, it has become 
imperative that experts and decision makers take account of people's perceptions of 
risk and their ability to tolerate or accept risk. 
The literature on perceived risk and acceptable risk through a period of very rapid 
change is examined in this publication Continuing development in this area means 
that we must continue to monitor techniques for estimating perceived risk and also 
explore the links with acceptable risk in order to provide decision makers at all levels 
with appropriate information 
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Summary 
Chapter 2 What is risk? 
Risk is a compound measure comprising a probability of occurrence of an 
(adverse) event and a magnitude of the consequences. Risk is always 
associated with a choice of actions with a series of possible outcomes that 
mayor may not be known and quantifiable. 
There are a number of different ways of defining risk, the most useful of 
which include real risk, statistical risk, predicted risk and perceived risk. 
Other descriptors used are actual risk, subjective risk and objective risk. 
Some authors also consider the concepts of technical risk and social risk. 
Chapter 3 Approaches to the study of perceived risk and acceptable risk 
The main methods used to study perceived risk and acceptable risk are 
described as revealed preferences, expressed preferences, implied 
preferences and natural standards. 
The method of revealed preferences uses available statistics of behaviour 
to infer underlying preferences. It is a societal measure and is generally 
associated with the determination of acceptable risk. The method of 
expressed preferences involves questioning individuals directly. The 
information obtained is an individual estimate and requires aggregation in 
order to obtain societal estimates. 
The method of implied preferences looks at societal institutions as a 
means of reflecting current values, while the method of natural standards 
uses geological time rather than historical time as a determinant of 
acceptable risk. 
There are positive and negative aspects of all the above approaches and a 
combined approach is likely to be the most useful. 
(i) 
Chapter 4 Perceived risk/risk perceptions 
Perceived risk is the individual or group evaluation of the risk likely to 
result from a certain activity. Risk preferences are used to infer perceived 
risk. 
Reasons for studying perceived risk include the need to obtain greater 
understanding of where and how expert predictions and lay perceptions of 
risk differ. From this, we may be able to achieve greater success in 
resolving risk conflicts, not by explaining why public perceptions are 
'wrong' but by improving the communication between experts and lay 
people and by increasing the mutual respect and understanding between 
the two parties. 
There are many factors affecting the way in which people perceive risk, 
and one of the main themes of risk perception research involves 
identifying these factors and interpreting their influence. 
People use a series of heuristics to estimate the probability of risk. These 
heuristics are well understood and may be used to influence the way 
people think about risk. 
Risk decision making is a political process and perceived risk is one input 
to that process. Credibility of decision making is an important 
determinant of acceptable risk. 
Chapter 5 Methods used to calculate perceived risk 
The expressed preference approach to estimating perceived risk involves 
three main techniques: psychometric scaling, simple social surveys and 
attitude surveys. 
Other less frequently used techniques include multidimensional scaling, 
contingent valuation and analysis of variance. 
(ii) 
Chapter 6 Acceptable risk (or how safe is safe enough?) 
One of the initial difficulties in estimating acceptable risk is in actually 
defining the term 'acceptable risk'. An early conclusion is that risks are 
not acceptable, but options (leading to outcomes) are. Other descriptors 
used in place of acceptable risk include accepted risk, necessary risk, 
tolerable risk and unknown (or apparently acceptable) risk. 
Safety is also a form of 'acceptable' risk. Safety must, however, be 
thought of in relative terms, for example a is safer than f3 rather than as 
an absolute level of safety. 
A common approach to acceptable risk has been the setting of threshold 
conditions below which there is considered to be no harm to humans. 
These levels change as greater information becomes available and there is 
often considerable statistical and measurement difficulty associated with 
them. 
The relationship between acceptable risk and perceived risk hinges on a 
balance of risks and benefits (or perceived risk and perceived benefit). 
Perceived risk is a determinant of acceptable risk, or a major input into 
the acceptable risk decision-making process. 
The relationship between acceptable risk and risk assessment and risk 
management is important also. Risk management (as a part of risk 
assessment) seeks to ensure that risks are kept within levels deemed 
'acceptable' by the risk decision-making process, which includes risk 
assessment. 
Chapter 7 Methods used for calculating acceptable risk 
The methods used to calculate acceptable risk are very similar to the 
methods used to evaluate risk as part of risk assessment. This reinforces 
the notion of 'acceptable risk' as a process itself. They include risk 
aversion, risk balancing, cost effectiveness (or risk reduction) and 
cost(-risk)-benefit balancing. 
Equity issues are an important part of the determination of acceptable 
risk levels, since an implicit risk-benefit balancing is implied. The 
question may become 'what is a fair or equitable risk' rather than 'what is 
an acceptable risk'. 
(iii) 
Chapter 8 Implications for risk perceptions research 
Attitudes towards perceived risk and the study of perceived risk have 
changed considerably over the past 10 years. It is now fairly widely 
accepted that perceived risk has an important part to play in the risk 
decision-making process, and that lay perceptions of risk should not be 
dismissed as irrational or irrelevant. Current efforts are being directed 
towards increasing understanding of why experts' predictions and lay 
perceptions differ, and improving communication between the two groups. 
The future of risk perception research probably lies in the area of risk 
communication and using the information gained on risk perceptions to 
alert experts to the areas in which greater and better directed information 
is required. 
The major conclusion is that perceived risk and acceptable risk estimates 
are very important components of the (environmental) risk 
decision-making process and that the credibility of the process requires 
greater recognition of the role of the public. 
(iv) 
1.0 Introduction 
This publication details a survey of the literature relating to the areas of perceived 
risk and acceptable risk. It comprises steps one to four of the research project being 
undertaken at the Centre for Resource Management for the Ministry for the 
Environment entitled "the analysis of common risk measures: 'perceived' risk versus 
'actual' risk; 'acceptable' risk versus 'accepted' risk; and the relationship to conflict 
review and resolution". This pUblication is directed towards objectives one and four 
of the project, which are: 
to critically examine the literature on approaches to measuring 
and evaluating perceived risk and the relationship to actual risk; 
and 
to use the knowledge gained from the study of perceived risk to 
increase understanding of acceptable risk and risk comparisons. 
The approach taken to achieving these objectives followed a series of tasks. These 
were: 
(1) a bibliographic search of nine library on-line reference files 
belonging to the DIALOG Information Retrieval Service (see 
Appendix A for details of these files); 
(2) a further search of the New Zealand Bibliographic Network; 
(3) inspection of the title and abstract information obtained to 
determine which references required following up; 
(4) acquisition of this material firstly by checking available library 
sources and then using interloan facilities; 
(5) examination of the received material; and 
(6) preparation of this publication summarising the information 
gained. 
This publication is divided into chapters. Chapter 2 describes risk in general terms 
and provides definitions for the different risk measures delineated by risk 
researchers. Perceived risk and acceptable risk concepts are introduced and defined 
in the context of this publication. 
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The different attitudes that have been adapted to the study of perceived risk and 
acceptable risk are documented in Chapter 3. 
Chapter 4 discusses perceived risk and risk perceptions and their character and 
implications for risk decision making, while Chapter 5 outlines the methods used to 
calculate perceived risk estimates and describes some of the reported studies. 
Acceptable risk and risk acceptance are examined in Chapter 6. The links with 
perceived risk are drawn and the dilemma associated with the moral implications of 
the use of acceptable risk estimates is examined. In Chapter 7 the methods used to 
estimate acceptable risk are described. 
Finally, in Chapter 8 the implications of risk perceptions and acceptable risk for risk 
decision making are considered, current positions with respect to perceived risk 
research are summarised, and suggestions for future research are made. 
Appendix A contains information on the bibliographic search undertaken for this 
project, while in Appendix B some aspects of questionnaire design are considered. 
Appendix C contains outlines of a selection of specific studies where risk 
perceptions have been estimated. Appendix D provides a brief historical survey of 
the development of perceived risk and acceptable risk research. 
This publication is part of a series of reports all concerned with risk and uncertainty 
and their place in the environmental decision-making process. Perceived risk and 
acceptable risk have important implications for risk assessment which is a 
component of this process. 
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2.0 What is risk? 
Risk is "a compound measure of the probability and 
magnitude of adverse effect" 
(Lowrance, 1979). 
The research project which led to this project is part of an ongoing research 
programme with the primary objective of examining risk within the decision-making 
process. Therefore, it is appropriate to look at risk as having three elements: 
(1) a choice of action; 
(2) a probability of occurrence; and 
(3) a magnitude or consequence associated with the outcomes. 
It is important to stress that risk involves a choice, even though the action taken may 
involve remaining with the status quo. Risk has also been described as being a 
product of actions and not an attribute of things. This means that risk is associated 
with a decision and does not exist in isolation. 
The characteristics of the outcome of the chosen action are size, timing and extent. 
The consequences may also be positive or negative - some risky decisions have gain 
as their objective, as in the case of financial risk. 
Risk can be quantified for a particular outcome (where suitable data are available) 
by multiplying the probability of that outcome occurring by the magnitude of the 
adverse effect. Often, however, risk analysts prefer to keep the two aspects of risk 
separate so that risk is expressed in terms of a probability and a popUlation at risk. 
There are reasons for and against this separation. One reason for it is that 
numerically equivalent risks (expressed in terms of a single number) may have 
totally different characteristics in terms of consequences, so that equating them 
becomes nonsensical. A low consequence high probability risk may be equivalent to 
a high consequence low probability risk but the character of the two risks and the 
way in which the risks are perceived will be totally different. 
For example, the injury risk to a child of falling off a bicycle whilst learning to ride 
has a high probability and low magnitude (grazed knee). It may be numerically 
equivalent to a low probability, high consequence (death) risk such as the risk to a 
skydiver of a parachute not opening. This example illustrates some of the 
difficulties in measuring risk in that it is difficult to evaluate consequences where 
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units are very often non-commensurate. More importantly it demonstrates the need 
to keep track of the sensitivity and relative weights of the component parts when 
evaluating risk estimates. 
There is an important although obvious difference between risk and hazard. The 
term hazard can be used as an explicit engineering term, however, in the general risk 
literature a hazard is the possible negative outcome about which there may be 
considerable uncertainty in terms of both likelihood and magnitude. The Royal 
Society (1981) description of a hazardous situation is a "situation that in particular 
circumstances could lead to harm, where harm is loss to human beings or human 
populations". 
Lowrance (1979) classifies hazards into six categories: infectious and degenerative 
diseases; 'natural' hazards; failure of large technological systems; discrete, 
small-scale accidents; low-level, delayed-effect hazards; and sociopolitical 
disruptions. It is worth pointing out that these may not be exhaustive and are 
certainly not mutually exclusive. Howev~r, the classification is useful in that it goes 
beyond the more common man-made versus natural hazards. The research 
presented here is primarily directed towards environmental risk, which can 
incorporate most of these hazards. 
Okrent (1980) uses the example of the hazard of drowning as an illustration of the 
differences between risk and hazard. Passengers crossing the Atlantic in an ocean 
liner face the same individual hazard of drowning (or the ship sinking) as the crew 
of a rowing boat crossing the Atlantic. To an individual, however, the risk 
associated with crossing in a rowing boat is greater than the risk associated with 
crossing in a larger ship (since the probability of drowning is greater). 
This also illustrates the difference between individual risk and group risk. The 
magnitude of the risk to the individual is the same in both cases. The magnitude of 
the group risk is greater in the case of the ocean liner because a greater number of 
people is involved (the estimated group risk in the two cases may therefore be much 
more similar than the individual risk). 
So far we have considered risk in terms of possible adverse effect on people. This 
may be viewed as health risk. We are also concerned with environmental risk or the 
risk to humans and the things that they value. This definition of risk is useful since 
it can include environmental systems that are largely unknown, but which have value 
because of their mere existence. For the remainder of this publication, the term risk 
will be taken to refer to environmental risk as defined here. 
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2.1 Different risk measures 
This section is derived directly from Gough (1988a) with minor adaption. 
Risk cannot be defined uniquely because we cannot measure risk until after the 
event. We can estimate or predict risk now but we cannot measure it now. When 
we consider the risk of a particular decision, uncertainty associated with both the 
probabilities and the outcomes means that we cannot accurately measure the 
(future) risk we are trying to assess. Starr et at. (1976) define four measures of 
(future) risk. 
(1) Real risk: determined eventually by future circumstances when 
they develop fully. 
(2) Statistical risk: determined by currently available data, typically 
measured actuarily. 
(3) Predicted risk: predicted analytically from systems models 
structured from historical data. 
(4) Perceived risk: seen intuitively by individuals. 
Real risk is thus a hypothetical concept. It is often never able to be evaluated, and 
can only be determined in the future if the risk being studied is defined over a 
specific time period. This temporal element is very important in any form of risk 
analysis since risk is inevitably oriented towards the future. 
Statistical risk and predicted risk are often called objective estimates whereas 
perceived risk is known as a subjective estimate or sometimes, a personal 
probability. Frequencies or probabilities of death, injury or damage can be derived 
from numbers of recorded events and calculated popUlations. In epidemiological 
studies risk is calculated from recorded cases and the data are extrapolated to obtain 
estimates of risk for population sizes beyond the scope of the statistical sample. 
Simulation models can similarly be constructed to produce estimates of risk for 
situations that cannot be measured in nature. Examples of this type of calculation 
include models of nuclear power station explosions or similar events that have a very 
low probability of occurrence. 
The difference between statistical risk and predicted risk can be quite subtle. They 
are both derived from historical information. The difference is that statistical risk is 
based on observed frequencies that can be evaluated by normal statistical means, 
whereas predicted risk is a theoretical probability valid only to the extent that the 
model from which it has been derived is able to be validated. They are both 
'objective' probabilities and can be challenged as being irrelevant in one-off 
situations. 
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Perceived risk is a 'subjective' measure of risk. Perceived risk and predicted risk 
often represent maximum and minimum estimates of real risk with statistical risk 
lying somewhere in the middle. 
The term actual risk is often used also. It means scientifically calculated or 
experienced mortality (we will return to the use of mortality as a risk measure later) 
and as such it is equivalent to statistical risk. The term actual risk is sometimes 
used as a synonym for real risk, however, as it is measured in the past it can only be 
an estimator for real risk. In common with Gough (1988a), we will try to avoid the 
use of the term 'actual' risk as it has misleading connotations. So-called 'objective' 
estimates often contain considerable subjective bias as a result of a lack of 
appropriate raw data and the need for assumptions in the estimation process. 
Perceived risk is a judgement or valuation of consequences by individuals or groups 
of people. Whether estimates of risk are made by scientists or lay people, they 
cannot avoid containing elements of opinion. This derives from the way in which 
people design models or experiments, the weighting which they give to social 
importance, the way in which they select or derive data and even in the risks they 
choose to study (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982b). Therefore, we must discard the 
notion of an absolute truth and recognise that people see the world differently 
(Otway and Thomas, 1982) and that they want different outcomes for themselves 
and others. The way people perceive risk also affects the way in which they view the 
outcomes. 
2.2 Technical risk and social risk 
So far, we have emphasised the definition of risk as a product of probability and 
magnitude. This is sometimes referred to as the 'technical concept' of risk. An 
alternative approach to defining risk leads to the 'social concept' of risk. In 
common with a number of other authors, Kasperson et al. (1988) believe that 
perception studies show that "most people have a much more comprehensive 
conception of risk". The primary argument is that a number of other factors 
influence risk, including voluntariness, ability to control risk, familiarity with the 
hazard, and the nature of the hazard in terms of catastrophe potential and 'dread' 
aspects. They conclude that "the technical concept of risk is too narrow and 
ambiguous to serve as the crucial yardstick for policy making". 
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Whyte (1982) postulates the expansion of the simple equation 
risk - p.m (1) 
where p = probability, and m = magnitude, 
to 
risk = p.mn (2) 
where n is variable and related to societal values. 
This is an interesting way of exploring the relationship between technical risk, as 
defined in equation (1), and social risk, described in equation (2), but unless an 
attempt is made to quantify n it does little to increase our knowledge or add to our 
ability to predict and estimate risk. 
Another hypothesis for explaining the difference is that people, either as individuals 
or groups, do not explicitly link the probability and magnitude of risk in this way, but 
simply consider risk in terms of two elements, each of which has relevance in 
different contexts. 
The 'social concept' of risk, however, does not necessarily conflict with the technical 
concept of expected risk as a compound of probability and magnitude of 
consequence. In Section 4.3 we discuss factors affecting risk perceptions. These 
factors affect the way in which people develop their estimates of risk, which we refer 
to as risk perceptions or perceived risk. We note that experts and lay people differ 
as to their evaluation of magnitude of risk as well as probability of risk. The main 
difference here is that lay people consider risk in terms other than injury, death or 
loss of property. Both parties use partially quantitative and partially qualitative 
(affected by assumptions and hypotheses) processes to estimate risk. Our contention 
is that the only difference between the technical concept and the social concept is in 
the factors that influence the estimation. 
7 
3.0 Approaches to the study of perceived risk 
and acceptable risk 
A number of approaches have been employed in the study of perceived risk and 
acceptable risk. These are generally classified as revealed preferences, implied 
preferences, expressed preferences and natural standards. The concept of 
preferences derives from economics, however, psychologists use the same tools 
under different labels. The counterpart of the revealed preference economist is the 
behavioural psychologist and the counterpart of the expressed preference economist 
is the cognitive psychologist working in the area of social psychology (Royal Society, 
1983). 
Renn and Swaton (1984) summarise three "key questions" of risk perception as: 
(1) what are the social goals, values or motives that drive persons or 
social groups to attribute special concerns to specific risk 
sources; 
(2) in what way do people process information about risk sources 
and what kind of logical structure do they follow in an overall 
judgement on the acceptability of a perceived risk; and 
(3) what kind of motivational or cognitive biases are incorporated 
when people select information from the various sources that 
they have access to (and why do they apparently violate their 
own rules of reasoning)? 
They divide risk perception studies into four categories: classical decision analysis, 
psychological decision theory, socio-psychological judgement and attitude theory, 
and sociological systems theory and policy analysis. 
Classical decision analysis uses maximising utility axioms to look at the differences 
between intuitive perceptions and 'normative' risk assessment (question three). 
The method of revealed preferences fits in here. 
Psychological decision theory emphasises an individual's common-sense approach 
and assumes that individuals have "specific value clusters which influence the 
weighting of attributes connected with the perception of a given object" (Renn and 
Swaton, 1985). The behavioural psychologist (Royal Society, 1983) tries to analyse 
how people process information and arrive at judgements using expressed 
preferences. This process addresses question two. 
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Social psychological research and the cognitive psychologist (Royal Society, 1983) on 
the other hand concentrate lion the interaction between social environment and 
personal judgement ..... ". Perception becomes "a process of deriving attributes . 
. . . . from specific social values and personal attitudes". It is directed towards 
questions one and two above and uses the method of revealed preferences. 
Sociological systems theory looks at the effects of social interrelations between 
groups, and group responses to risk (question one). 
The development of the use of the different approaches to the study of risk 
perceptions and their influence on the concept of acceptable risk is summarised in 
Appendix D. The remainder of this Chapter looks at the different approaches and 
identifies the general conclusions associated with them. 
3.1 Revealed preferences 
The term revealed preference was introduced to economics in 1938 by Samuelson. 
The revealed preference axiom is that the consumer, by choosing a collection of 
goods in anyone budget situation reveals his preference for that particular 
collection. The chosen 'basket' maximises the utility of the consumer and the 
revealed preference for a particular collection of goods implies the maximisation of 
the utility of the consumer (Koutsoyiannis, 1980). 
The revealed preference method for estimating risk as initially proposed by Starr in 
1969, is based on the assumption that society has adjusted to a balance of risk and 
benefit that it finds acceptable. It considers both risks and benefits in deducing a 
decision rule. A new technology's risks are considered acceptable if they do not 
exceed the level of risk associated with ongoing technologies which have a similar 
benefit to society (Fischhoff, Lichtenstein et ai. 1981). The method of revealed 
preferences is thus associated with the calculation of acceptable risk. 
Rowe (1980) represents this comparison of risks and benefits as a nearly optimal 
balance. A major assumption is that this balance is static and will continue into the 
future. Statistics of behaviour are then used to infer underlying preferences. Two 
further assumptions are involved in this approach: firstly, that costs and benefits can 
be measured in the economic market place; and secondly, that people have sufficient 
information available to them to make intelligent (rational) choices. 
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The revealed preference method is the tool of the behavioural psychologist. A 
major limitation results from the assumption that past accepted levels of safety are 
applicable to the future. These levels are based on current income distribution, 
social structures and value systems which mayor may not be either currently 
applicable or desirable. Society does not have a fixed set of values: value systems 
are dynamic, as can be seen by the increasing concern about risk in our everyday 
environment. 
The benefit of the revealed preference approach is that it deals with societal 
decisions, rather than models. The disadvantages are that it deals with the past, that 
multiple relationships make it difficult to extract the required information and also 
that it considers only with physical risks. 
Starr (1969) used this approach to try to improve upon the simple comparison of 
risks that had been previously used. He considered the relationship between risk of 
death and economic benefit for a number of common technologies. 
His four main conclusions were that: 
(1) the indications are that the public is willing to accept 'voluntary' 
risks roughly 1000 times greater than 'involuntary' risks; 
(2) the statistical risk of death from disease appears to be a 
psychological yardstick for establishing the level of acceptability 
of other risks; 
(3) the acceptability of risk appears to be crudely proportional to the 
third power of the benefits (real or imagined); and 
(4) the level of risk tolerated for voluntarily accepted risks is quite 
similar to the level of risk from disease. 
Fischhoff, Slovic et al. (1978) refer to these findings as "laws of acceptable risk". 
There have been a number of attempts made to duplicate the results derived by 
Starr. Otway and Pahner (1976) conclude that "while the Starr hypothesis regarding 
the identification of these determinants (or at least the first and third) was probably 
philosophically correct, the results could not be justified on the basis of his analysis. 
The Decision Research group of Slovic, Fischhoff, Lichtenstein and others also 
attempted unsuccessfully to repeat Starr's work. This illustrates one of the major 
drawbacks of the revealed preferences approach as a means of estimating acceptable 
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risk. It is very difficult to obtain consistent estimates of risks and benefits for 
technologies that are very different in character. Therefore the method has 
considerable measurement difficulties. 
The second of Starr's conclusions has been refuted by many researchers. People's 
perceptions of risk vary according to possible types of injury and the type of hazard 
(dread/commonplace, catastrophic) involved. It has also been shown that people's 
perceptions are not solely related to death and physical. injury, but also include 
mental and psychological damage associated with hazards. 
An important point, however, is that although Starr's results were questioned, 
nobody actually questioned the use of the concept of acceptable risk as a basis for 
further investigation (Bicevskis, 1982). Risks exist in society, and decision makers 
are required to make decisions that involve risk. Therefore, it is important that 
decision makers are given information about the social acceptability of the risks. 
Value of life studies use variants of the revealed preference method also. Examples 
include using life insurance statistics to estimate individual's perceptions of the value' 
of life. 
To summarise, the drawbacks of the revealed preference method are that: 
(1) past behaviour is not a valid predictor of present preferences; 
(2) the approach is politically conservative; 
(3) it ignores distributional and equity questions; 
(4) it makes strong assumptions about the rationality of decision 
making in the market place; 
(5) it assumes that people have full information, and that they use it 
optimally; and 
(6) there is considerable difficulty in developing the risklbenefit 
measures required. (Fischhoff et ai., 1985). 
The method's major advantage is that it provides an aggregated social measure of 
perceived risk, albeit a retrospective one. 
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3.2 Expressed preferences 
The method of expressed preferences involves questioning individuals and obtaining 
information directly from them. It derives from the original Fischhoff, Slovic et al. 
(1978) study and their attempts to firstly duplicate Starr's work and subsequently to 
develop an approach "analogous to the psychometric analysis of questionnaire data". 
Ways of getting information include referenda, opinion surveys, detailed questioning 
and taped interviews. There is thus no need to convert values into dollars 
(commensurate units) as is required in the revealed preference method. The 
assumptions are that people understand the questions they are being asked, that they 
are given enough information to make an informed answer and that their behaviour 
is rational and consistent. 
The chief results from this research have been that researchers have concluded that 
perceived risk is indeed quantifiable and predictable (Slovic, 1987) and that the 
technique is suitable for looking at similarities and differences between groups with 
respect to perceptions and attitudes. A major finding has been that risk means 
different things to different people (see Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982b) and that 
judgements of risk are related to a number of different hazard characteristics. A 
further consistent result is that most people regard current levels of risk as being too 
high, confirming the belief that people judge risk according to a wider framework 
than technical experts (see Chapter 4). 
The main difficulties with the expressed preference approach are associated with 
obtaining a large enough sample which is considered representative of the 
population at large. The main studies to date have used small samples with known 
characteristics and likely biases. As stated by Crouch and Wilson (1982), however, 
carefully designed questions and explicit recognition of likely biases can reduce 
these disadvantages. A further criticism made by experts is that safety issues are too 
complicated for the public to understand. Fischhoff et al. (1985) compared the 
expressed preferences approach with the revealed preferences approach. They 
consider that the results of this study refute the criticism that the public cannot 
understand the type of information they are asked for in the former approach. 
Other criticisms of the expressed preference approach, however, which they list are 
that people do not have well articulated preferences, values may be incoherent, 
people may not know what they want and they may not be willing to adjust their 
attitudes in the face of this ignorance. All questionnaire approaches suffer from the 
limitation that by the very act of questioning people you affect their opinions. One 
way of ameliorating these effects is by posing the same question in several different 
ways, however, this does not eliminate the problem. 
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The expressed preference method is generally applied by the cognitive psychologist 
and has been used by Fischhoff et al. (1978, 1980, 1981; and see also Slovic et al. 
1979, 1982, 1985, 1986) to estimate perceived risk. 
Another perspective is offered by McCormick (1981) who suggests that a revealed 
preference study is "an adequate guide of people's perceptions" only if you believe 
that rational decision making should be left to experts who use past policies as a 
basis for prescribing future actions. Expressed preference studies will therefore be 
effective only if you believe that people's present opinions should be the primary 
basis for decision making, and also, if you believe that people act on their expressed 
preferences. 
The Royal Society report (1983) recommends that comparisons between the 
revealed preference and expressed preference methods (for determining acceptable 
risk) should not be made, as the two approaches provide complementary 
information. We will consider further the relationship between acceptable risk and 
perceived risk and specific methods used for their estimation in succeeding chapters. 
3.3 Implied preferences 
Implied preferences are ascertained by looking at the (legal) institutions that society 
has set up with regard to risk in the past. These standards reflect current values and 
imply tradeoffs between costs, risks and benefits. Proponents do not view the 
balance as represented in law as an optimal balance but think of it as society's best 
attempt to date. Rowe (1980) sees this approach as a compromise between the 
revealed and expressed preference approaches. 
The main deficiencies are that legal structures are neither complete nor entirely 
consistent. As a result interpreting the information can be tortuous and time 
consuming. In the United States further problems are introduced by inconsistency 
between local, State and Federal institutional arrangements. 
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3.4 Natural standards 
The natural standards approach adopts the stance that safety standards should be 
independent of a particular society and that geological time rather than historical 
time should be used as a source of 'biological wisdom' (as opposed to social wisdom) 
(Fischhoff, Lichtenstein et al., 1981). In this way, standards for residues of 
chemicals, heavy metals, radiation etc. would be linked to those found in 
'representative' periods in archaeological digs. Another approach would be to allow 
levels that are minorly above those considered as naturally occurring (such as 
background radiation). 
Douglas and Wildavsky (1982b) also explore this concept and describe it as 
"whatever levels of risk man and animals have lived with in the past are supposedly 
tolerable for the future". 
There are considerable benefits to Douglas and Wildavsky's approach in that it 
removes the need to establish dose-response relationships and threshold levels, 
however, there is obviously limited applicability (in terms of substances for which 
there is no historical precedent). Other problems include dealing with multiple 
pollutants resulting from some technologies. Cumulative effects result from the fact 
the natural exposure does not decrease, and everything new is an incremental 
addition. Further, it is likely that in some cases the so called 'natural' level, which 
itself reflects historical cumulative effects, would be unacceptable to present society. 
This approach does not take account of changing values or of the great changes that 
people have already imposed on their environment that counter the spirit of the 
concept. Also, it is subject to individual or group bias that may be manipulated to 
reflect whichever version of reality the decision maker wants to see. 
3.5 Choosing an approach 
Fischhoff et al. (1985) make a number of points which need to be considered when 
choosing an approach to studying or estimating perceived or acceptable risk. 
Firstly, account must be taken of political reality. That is, the chosen approach must 
reflect the political reality of the situation, otherwise it will be rejected. Decisions 
about levels of acceptable risk are political decisions. It is crucial to recognise this 
point. Risk decisions are made in the political arena and unless a technique is 
publicly accepted and politically credible the results obtained by its use will not be 
accepted by the decision makers. Technical experts are becoming more and more 
aware of this factor as they seek to regain lost credibility. 
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Secondly, no single approach to estimating perceived risk or acceptable risk is clearly 
superior to the others in all situations. Although this seems to be a reasonable 
conclusion there are many examples of techniques being used simply because the 
analyst is more familiar with the approach than because it is appropriate to the 
context. 
Thirdly, there is a need for risk analysts to be open about the approaches used, to be 
clear about the quality of the data and to be prepared to revise estimates upon 
gaining additional information. Risk estimates are often derived from situations 
where a lack of appropriate data or other factors mean that uncertainty as to the 
actual outcomes and their likely effects reflects upon the quality of the results. 
Presentation format is a very important factor in convincing decision makers and 
analysts must take great care to provide all the relevant background information so 
that decision makers and the public do not feel that they are being misled. 
Finally, Fischhoff et al. believe that as it is unlikely that better approaches will be 
developed analysts should work at applying combined approaches that will aim at 
improving understanding of the particular problems which the approaches are being 
applied to. 
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4.0 Perceived risk/risk perceptions 
Perceived risk is the individual or group, judgement or valuation of the magnitude 
and likelihood of the possible 'bad' outcomes which may result from an action. Our 
willingness to take a risk is measured by the subjective probabilities which we place 
upon the alternative actions and our judgement as to the possible magnitude of these 
outcomes. This depends upon the environment in which the actions are taken. 
In Chapter 2 we discussed subjective and objective risk estimates. We stated that 
perceived risk is a subjective measure. We also stressed that although statistical and 
predicted risk estimates are commonly considered to be objective risk measures, 
their calculation generally requires the use of assumptions and extrapolation of data 
which reduces the objectivity of the estimation. This is seen when different equally 
reputable experts or analysts are given similar information and data and yet produce 
different numerical estimates, all of which may be valid, according to the framework 
chosen for analysis. Therefore, when we talk about perceived risk as being a 
subjective estimate we are not implying that this SUbjectivity is to be measured 
against another purely objective estimate obtained by other means. 
Risk preferences are closely connected with perceived risk. In Chapter 3 
approaches to measuring perceived risk and acceptable risk were examined. The 
two most commonly used approaches rely on the analysis of individual and group 
preferences. The revealed preference axiom is a utility maximising approach while 
expressed preferences are extracted from direct questioning of individuals. The 
application of these methods is discussed further in Chapters 5 and i. 
Whyte (1982) describes risk perception as a "useful but compendium term" that in 
fact includes three components: awareness, knowledge and values. Being aware of a 
risk simply means that an individual recognises the name of the risk. It does not 
imply any knowledge of the risk other than that it exists (and that it is considered to 
be a risk). Knowledge is related to an individual's personal characteristics but 
awareness is not. People's value structures also contribute towards perceptions and 
these are correlated with individual characteristics and social context. 
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Slovic (1987) defines the aim of research into risk perceptions as being to aid risk 
analysis and policy making by: 
(1) providing a basis for understanding and anticipating public 
responses to hazards; and 
(2) improving the communication of risk information among lay 
people, technical experts, and decision makers. 
It should be noted that understanding that there is a potential risk is related to 
knowledge, but includes social and ethical aspects. This is an important factor in 
communication also, since value structures are often a barrier to effective 
communication. 
So far we have discussed risk as a 'real' concept deriving from our society and our 
use of the environment. Douglas and Wildavsky (1982a and b) believe that part of 
the problem is more basic than this. From studies of different cultures and social 
principles they introduce the notion that different societies choose different 'sets' of 
risks to be concerned with. This is a form of risk perception in itself. We have 
earlier suggested that this selectivity introduces subjectivity into risk estimation. 
Douglas and Wildavsky suggest that the divergence between perceptions may be 
partially concerned with our society)-s failure to explicitly define the risks which it is 
concerned with. Thus, to alter risk perception social organisation must be altered. 
Slovic (1987) believes that the message so far obtained from risk perception research 
is that "risk communicatIon and risk management are doomed to fail unless they are 
structured as a two-way process" and that as well as lay people and experts having 
something to contribute to decision making and management, each side must respect 
the other. 
This has major implications for the importance of risk perception research. Risk 
estimates, whether they be technical assessments or perceived risk estimates are 
input to the risk decision-making process. This process and its relationship to the 
risk-assessment process has been discussed fully in Gough (1989). The important 
point to bring out here is that both of these processes are incomplete unless the 
management function is also complete. We use the term risk management as 
meaning the implementation phase following the making of the decision. This 
includes actioning the recommendations associated with the decision, 
communicating the decision to all 'interested' parties, following up the actions by 
monitoring the results and, if necessary, providing for a re-assessment of the 
decision. Unless risk management is undertaken, it is not possible to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the risk decision-making process. 
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4.1 Why study risk perceptions? 
Otway and Thomas (1982) adopt a cynical view of risk perception research, stating 
that they believe that in general the (implicit) objective of the research is a 
justification of the political decision-making process. 
At the time, this stimulated a debate about the purpose of the research which was 
beneficial to both researchers and decision makers. It helped both parties to clarify 
the issues involved, to assess the implications of the work to date and to set 
directions for future work. 
In Chapter 2 we described risk as a compound of probability and magnitude. The 
word 'compound' is used deliberately. Multiplying these together, as in classical 
decision theory, we can obtain an expected value of risk. This can be described as a 
technocratic viewpoint. It considers risk as a quantifiable estimate. In this context, 
perceived risk is simply another way of ineasuring or quantifying risk. On the other 
hand we can view the term compound more loosely and say that both factors are 
important, but it is not necessarily valid to multiply the two together. 
The multiplicative version in part ignores the reasons why we seek to understand and 
estimate (in quantitative or qualitative terms) perceived risk. Macgill (1986) 
believes that the "complexities and determinants of perceptions of risk need to be 
explained using sound methodology and empirical evidence so that policy advisors 
and decision makers can address questions of risk assessment for a better informed 
position". This is consistent with the need for sound risk management as outlined in 
Section 4.0. 
Politicians and decision makers have considerable difficulty in dealing with 
perceived risk because estimates of perceived risk are often widely divergent from 
statistical estimates. There is a tendency for technical experts and decision makers 
to view so-called objective characterisations of risk as somehow more real or more 
valid than individuals' perceptions of risk. But as Kasper (1979b) notes, for most 
people it is their perception that has the immediate effect on their thoughts and 
actions. Further, while citizens often make bad judgements, scientists do as well 
(Freudenburg, 1988). 
A number of authors have used the apparent divergence between expert and lay 
perceptions of risk to conclude that lay people are not competent to judge 
technological risk and therefore perceived risk represents an emotive or irrational 
response that is not worthy of consideration. Lee (1981a) states that "it is tempting 
but false to think of objective risk as a moderately accurate way of arriving at real 
risks and of public perception as dealing only with 'imaginary' or 'irrational' risk . . 
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· . .. we have to be aware that gaining effective measures of intangible benefits is, 
if anything, even more difficult than assessing costs". 
Why, therefore, does perceived risk differ from statistical risk? One of the primary 
reasons is the way in which we define risk. We have described the 'technical 
concept' of risk as a compound measure of a probability of occurrence and a 
magnitude or severity of impact. This mathematical approach to risk, which is 
common to engineers and scientists, ignores the social and cultural connotations of 
the term. Further, as pointed out by Lee (1981b), lay people measure severity in 
different ways to scientists. Some of the negative impacts that people use to 
measure severity when estimating perceived risk include loss of life, loss of dignity, 
damage to property and adverse effects in terms of values, quality of life etc. 
Statistical risk estimates are usually limited to severity in terms of loss of life, injury 
and sometimes damage to property. 
Experts and lay persons use their experience differently. Lay people collect and 
process information from personal experience and from contact with others. 
Experts use the general experience of society or larger groups (Renn and Swaton, 
1984). There are advantages and disadvantages to both approaches. The expert 
abstraction process does not take account of equity issues and is dependent on a 
reliable source of appropriate data. The personal experience approach may be 
deficient or inappropriate. 
Smith and Irwin (1984) suggest that the original motivation behind research into risk 
perceptions was an attempt to explain public irrationality. This is a flawed basis for 
discussion which apart from implying that lay perceptions are inaccurate also ignores 
the disagreement between experts over levels of risk and the range of influences 
over public perceptions of which statistical frequency is only a part. 
Continuing with this theme, Slovic~ Fischhoff and Lichtenstein (1979) investigated 
the belief held by a number of 'experts'~ that the study of perceived risk is a way of 
finding out how to educate the public so as to reduce their 'irrational' fears. They 
concluded that fear of nuclear power is not irrational, nor is it based on 
misconceived judgements as to the 'actual' risks involved. It is due in great measure 
to a low ranking of the perceived benefits from nuclear power and in part to the 
recognition of technical uncertainties in the risk assessment process. 
A further reason for the divergence is that extrapolation from the past is often a 
poor predictor of future experience. Lee (1981b) uses the price of oil as an example 
for this. 
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Fischhoff (in Covello et aI., 1981) lists six reasons why disagreements occur between 
the public and the experts: 
(1) the distinction between 'actual' and 'perceived' risk IS 
misconceived; 
(2) lay people and experts are talking different languages; 
(3) lay people and experts are solving different problems; 
(4) debates over substance may disguise battles over form and vice 
versa; 
(5) lay people and experts disagree about what is feasible; 
(6) lay people and experts see the facts differently. 
This list requires some explanation. We have already considered the semantic 
problem of 'actual' risk versus 'perceived' risk. This addresses reasons one and two 
of the above list. That 'lay people and experts are solving different problems' is an 
important idea. The most obvious example of this is the different ways in which 
experts and lay people perceive the hazard associated with an outcome. Lay people 
are concerned with lesser effects than death or serious injury, and when death is 
involved, the manner of death may also give rise to different values being placed on 
it. 
The divergence between 'actual' risk and 'perceived risk' does lead to public conflict. 
Risk conflicts tend to be conflicts of value rather than conflicts of interest (Gough, 
1989). As a result, the source of the conflict may be disguised either deliberately or 
unintentionally in order for one or other of the two sides to increase their credibility. 
An example from New Zealand recent experience arises from the application by 
Telecom to build a new, much larger microwave dish tower in Victoria Park on the 
hills above Christchurch. Objections on aesthetic grounds were received from 
adjacent local authorities. Residents also objected to the presence of the tower as a 
health hazard. There is a belief that part of the residents' objection was due to a 
belief that the tower would reduce property values in the immediate area. The 
residents' concerns were amplified by the fact that previous to this proposal Telecom 
had simply increased the height of an existing tower on this site without any recourse 
to the planning system. This also illustrates the effects that mistrust of the motives 
of the developing agency may have on peoples' perceptions and actions. 
Reason five above suggests that lay people and experts disagree about what is 
feasible. As an example, they may disagree about the ability (or willingness) of 
operators to conform to necessary strict codes for proper (safe?) handling of goods 
and use of toxic substances. Experts also disagree amongst themselves. The 
Victoria Park microwave tower application contains elements of this. Telecom 
insisted (initially) that the tower proposed was of the minimum height required to 
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perform the function. Other experts disagreed and the final option implemented 
was lower than that originally proposed. 
Lay people and experts do not so much 'see' the facts differently, but disagree as to 
what 'the facts' are. Risk assessment is primarily a technical process producing 
results that are seen by the experts as 'facts', however, lay people view these same 
results as containing subjective assessment and assumptions that are not consistent 
with the term 'fact'. 
Elms {1989} adds reason number {7} to this list: that lay people and experts have to 
make different decisions. Although this may seem logical, it must be remembered 
that decisions {in the context of this discussion} are made by decision makers. Lay 
people and experts have input to the decision-making process, but they are not 
decision makers. 
A further area of conflict is that experts and lay people tend to define the boundaries 
of risk differently. For example, consider the Seaview LPG storage facility location 
hearings. Experts had performed quantitative risk assessments for the facility itself, 
but did not consider the complete transport system associated with the storage of 
LPG for use in the Wellington and Hutt area. Local residents including the Petone 
area were very concerned that this aspect had been omitted and felt that the whole 
question of storage and transportation should have been addressed together. 
Risk assessment {Gough, 1988a and 1988b} is a two-step process of determination 
(comprising identification and estimation) and evaluation. Risk evaluation is an 
evaluation of the significance of the estimated risk {Griffiths, 1981}. Expert and lay 
perceptions about the risk being studied are part of the input to this social evaluation 
process. 
Perceived risk is important because it is associated with the evaluation stage of risk 
assessment. Risk analysis usually involves a great deal of uncertainty about both the 
possible outcomes of activities and the probability and magnitude of occurrence. 
Therefore, in order to make 'good' decisions {the objective of risk assessment}, 
decision makers require information about: 
(1) the technical, social and environmental aspects of the risk; 
(2) . the assumptions associated with technical calculations of 
probability and magnitude of the consequences of the risk; and 
(3) the public's perceptions regarding the probability and the 
{potential} consequences. 
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Methods for determining risk perceptions provide decision makers with important 
tools to evaluate the significance of the physical, social and political environment in 
which the risk decision is being made. Risk perception thus contributes to societal 
decisions about risk acceptability. 
If one of the criteria used for (political) decision making is social equity then 
decision makers should take account of the public perspective. Jasanoff (1987) 
believes that perceived risk is important because perception is reflected in political 
action. The Royal Society (1983) also notes that the public's viewpoint is an 
"essential datum" for risk decisions. However, as Renn and Swaton (1984) reiterate, 
perceptions are only one input into the decision-making process and in the event, 
both 'objective' and 'perceived' risk estimates must be considered and (eventually) 
reconciled (Lee, 1981a and b). 
4.2 Individual and group perceptions 
If measures of perceived risk are required for the public decision-making process, 
then it is necessary to estimate a measure of group perception. This may dictate the 
approach used. Methods for measuring revealed preferences, implied preferences 
and natural standards all produce group estimates of perceived risk. The method 
for measuring expressed preferences produces estimates of individual perceptions, 
which must then be aggregated in some way to a societal measure. As we will see 
later, one of the main difficulties associated with practical applications of the 
method of expressed preferences is the need to extrapolate from individual 
perceptions of risk to group perceptions. Associated with this another practical 
problem is that of obtaining representative samples, and further, of presenting this 
information in aggregated form. 
On the other hand, the definition of perceived risk that we have used refers to "risk 
as seen intuitively by individuals". Therefore, the individual aspect of perceived risk 
is also important. How we use this information is less clear. Slovic and Fischhoff 
defend their use of small, unrepresentative samples by suggesting that the difference 
between these samples produces the most useful information. This is important in 
that by characterising different community groups we may be able to predict their 
attitudes towards certain risks. 
The 'not in my back yard' (NIMBY) and 'not in anybody's back yard' (NIABY) 
attitudes towards particular risks are pertinent in this context also. Equity issues 
associated with the distribution of· perceived risks and perceived benefits affect 
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people's attitude towards risks. In particular, in the United States it has been shown 
that people are happy to accept hazardous waste dumps in the abstract (or somebody 
else's back yard) but not in their own local area (except in cases where such dumps 
already exist). This is reflected in political action by the efforts made by the United 
States Government to establish dump sites on Pacific Islands and in ocean trenches. 
4.3 Factors affecting risk perceptions 
Slovic et al. (1979), Griffiths (1981) and Covello et al. (1981) list some of the factors 
that affect our perceptions of risk probabilities and outcomes. 
They are: 
(1) whether the risk is voluntary or involuntary; 
(2) whether the consequence is likely to be immediate or delayed; 
(3) whether the subject is familiar or unfamiliar with the risk; 
(4) whether the risk is known to science or not; 
(5) what measure of control over the risk the subject has~ 
(6) whether it is a 'new' risk, or whether it has been previously 
experienced (not necessarily directly); 
(7) whether the effects are chronk, cumulative or catastrophic in 
nature; 
(8) whether the consequences are common or dread; 
(9) the severity of the consequences; 
(10) the sIze of the group exposed to the risk; 
(11) the distribution of the risk - is, exposure equitable; 
(12) the effect on future generations;. 
(13) the degree of personal exposure; 
(14) the global catastrophic nature of the risk; 
(15) the changing character of the risk; 
(16) whether there is seen to be any easy way of reducing the risk; 
(17) the availability of alternatives; 
(18) the necessity of exposure; 
(19) whether the hazard is encountered occupationally; 
(20) whether it affects 'average'people; 
(21) whether there is likely to be misuse; and 
(22) whether the consequences are reversible. 
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This list of factors is not ordered in any way. Various studies of risk perception (see 
Chapter 5) have attempted to isolate the major factors associated with perceptions 
of risk with some success for particular studies of specified risks. A complicating 
factor is that these factors are not independent. 
It is likely that different factors take precedence for different types of risk, or risks of 
similar character encountered under different circumstances. A simple example is 
that of a motor cycle racer who will happily race his bike at high speed on a track, 
despite high apparent danger to the observer, but who will refuse to ride the same 
bike on the public highway. Mountain climbers will similarly view two climbs of 
similar technical difficulty as vastly different in terms of risk if one is under a 
hanging ice-cliff (so called objective danger). In both these cases the factor which 
takes precedence is the degree of control which the subject feels he has (often 
misjudged) over the situation. 
In addition to these factors, or hazard characteristics as they are sometimes called, a 
number of demographic and socio-economic determinants such as age, sex, 
education, social class and income strata will affect individual and group 
perceptions. Whyte (1982) divides all these factors into three groups: the 
characteristics of the person, the context (social and economic) and the 
characteristics of the hazard. This grouping is useful. The characteristics of the 
person are influenced by personality as well as demographic factors. The social and 
economic context is important because it affects the way in which people apparently 
accept certain risks. 
For example, risk encountered occupationally is often treated differently to similar 
risk encountered outside the workplace. Workers at the Sellafield nuclear plant in 
Britain had different perceptions of the danger associated with the plant than retired 
people in the community, not because they had any greater knowledge of the risks 
associated, but because they were dependent on work from the plant (MacGill, 
1986). In other circumstances, where more choice is seen to exist, workers will not 
accept levels of risk in the workplace which they will happily face at home. 
Starr (1969) postulated that the voluntary nature of an activity influences its 
acceptability. Fischhoff, Slovic et (11. (1978) demonstrated that averages over 30 
voluntary and involuntary hazards showed that perceived risk did not correlate with 
voluntariness. This does not contradict Starr's conclusion because of the multiple 
relationships involved. The difference between perceived risk and acceptable risk 
levels may result in cases where participants do not feel satisfied that the regulatory 
mechanism effectively balances risks and benefits. 
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Krewski et al. (1987) conclude that three main factors seem to affect risk perception, 
and these are dread, understanding and the number of people involved. However, a 
high level of correlation between the factors means that the dread aspect is affected 
by control, catastrophe, fatal consequences and inequity whilst understanding is 
influenced by observability, newness and immediacy. This is consistent with the 
results of Slovic and Fischhoff in their earlier studies. 
One of the fundamental questions of risk perception is why do people emphasise 
some risks whilst ignoring others (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982a). Experts in the 
past have used this as a rationale for the argument that lay perceptions of risk are 
'irrational'. One answer to this is that risk choices reflect values and beliefs about 
social institutions and moral behaviour. Articulating risk preferences is seen as a 
way of influencing these social institutions. 
Risk perceptions are not static. This is one of the major limitations of the method 
of revealed preferences and also a problem in the technical estimation of risk. How 
perceptions change is not known and Johnson and Covello (1987) note that there is 
little in the current literature representing a "systematic and rigorous analysis of how 
perceptions and judgements arise from a host of complex factors including historical 
trends, underlying values, ideological currents and social, cultural, economic, 
scientific and political institutions". 
4.4 Heuristics 
Some attempts have been made to examine the thought processes which people use 
to make estimates of the probability of risk. 
Most of this work derives from Tversky and Kahnemann (1982) who suggest a series 
of heuristics or shortcuts which people use when they attempt to estimate risk. 
Heuristics are particular judgemental rules which people use to evaluate situations 
such as risky situations. 
The three most important of these are availability, representativeness and anchoring. 
People using the availability heuristic judge an event as likely or frequent if 
instances of it are easier to imagine or recall than rare events. Therefore~ the 
frequency (that is either frequent or infrequent) and most recent examples affect 
availability. People tend to give higher probabilities than is really warranted to 
comparatively rare events if they have seen or heard of an occurrence and lower 
probabilities to commonplace accidents. 
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The representativeness heuristic means that people 'place' an event by its 
characteristics. They estimate the probability of an event by its similarity to another 
type of event. The major fallacy or bias is associated with the so-called 'gambler's 
fallacy' which misjudges the law of probabilities and assumes that because something 
has not happened over a particular time period it is more likely to occur now. This 
fallacy is particularly evident when people are asked to judge comparatively rare 
events such as floods. 
Anchoring involves linking the risky situation to an initially presented value. If a 
risk is not particularly well known, and an initial estimate is given, then people tend 
to revise their estimate by making minor positive or negative adjustments to that 
initial value. Typically they make insufficient adjustment. 
Heuristics are valid in some circumstances and can lead to 'good' estimates of 
statistical risk in situations where risks are well known. In other cases (little known 
risks) they can lead to large and persistent biases. Although such limitations and 
biases can be easily demonstrated, it is not valid to label them as irrational since in 
most everyday situations, availability is a very good approach to estimating risk 
levels. Further, given appropriate information, people can be shown to apply 
judgement in cases of small sample situations. 
It must be remembered that experts also rely on heuristics when they have to apply 
judgement or rely on intuition. Fault trees, for example, are subject to the 
availability heuristic in terms of the options selected for study. 
It is an interesting point that the use of heuristics often leads to overconfidence in 
the results. Both lay people and experts place considerable (sometimes unjustified) 
faith in judgements reach using heuristics... It is important to remember in this area 
that 'awareness' of a hazard does not imply any other knowledge than that the hazard 
exists. People happily make judgements on such knowledge. 
Slovic (1986) looks at the difficulties people face in making unbiased estimates of 
risk in regard to risk communication. He discusses in particular, the influence of the 
media, the way in which recent events and experiences colour perceptions, the fact 
that people's.beliefs are difficult to modify, however inaccurately formed, and the 
ease with which it is possible to manipulate people's views (unformed) by varying 
presentation format. 
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4.5 Response to hazard 
"People respond to the hazard they perceive" 
(Slovic et ai., 1982a) 
If people's perceptions are faulty in some sense then efforts at 'protection' by social 
agencies are also going to be misperceived and conflict is likely to ensue. People's 
response is important as an outcome. 
As we have previously discussed, risk assessors commonly assume that the reason 
perceived risk and statistical risk estimates are at variance is because the public does 
not understand the 'true' risk. We have mentioned the 'other' factors including 
hazard characteristics and socio-economic factors that influence perceived risk and 
have looked at the different ways in which people consider risk. The hazard 
characteristics discussed in 4.3 are sometimes referred to as 'psychic responses' to 
the hazard. Mazur (1987) suggests a psychological model of perceived risk which is 
reproduced in Figure 1. 
objective 
psychic perceived or response 
statistical effect risk to 
risk hazard 
Figure 1. Psychological model of perceived risk. 
Source: Mazur, 1987. 
The importance of this model is that it reminds us that perceived risk is usually 
associated with an action (a decision) which will itself have an associated series of 
outcomes. Risk estimates, whether expert predictions or lay perceptions, are input 
to a decision-making process. 
Mazur points out that there are two effects here: the person's 'verbalised rationale' 
and the action of response. These may appear at times to be inconsistent. This is a 
common problem with any approach involving questioning individuals about their 
attitudes. There does not seem to be any general way of avoiding this bias or of 
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necessarily predicting it. Mazur suggests an adaption of the psychological model 
which he calls the sociological model of perceived risk (Figure 2). 
objective 
risk 
perceived 
risk 
Figure 2. Sociological model of perceived risk. 
Source: Mazur, 1987. 
social 
influences 
response 
to 
hazard 
This model allows for rationale being subsidiary to social influences and implies that 
changing behaviour requires changing social influences (eg smoking). 
Mazur postulates that social influences may be a more important determinant of 
response to a hazard than risk perception. This allows that reported perceptions 
may be merely post hoc rationalisations formulated to be consistent with the 
response and that in order to change people's behaviour we need to somehow 
change the social influences surrounding them. This recognition of peer pressure 
influences is commonly used in many advertising campaigns. 
4.6 Political agendas 
The primary purpose of making risk estimates is to provide the best information to a 
decision maker for the purpose of enabling a decision to be made. In many 
circumstances decisions have to be made in the· face of severe uncertainty. 
Disagreements between experts and lay persons resulting from decisions often occur 
not because of bias or SUbjectivity but because of the political implications of the 
decision. That is, decision makers may use information selectively with certain aims 
(Tham, 1979). 
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Starr (1985) contends that public acceptability is dependent more on public trust in 
hazard managers than on quantitative measures of such risk. This is a common 
theme in a number of papers and is noted also by Johnson and Baltensperger (1987) 
in conjunction with hazardous waste and nuclear power plant sitings. 
In order for the risk decision-making process to gain credibility with the public it 
must be seen to be open and fair. Experts and decision makers must to be careful to 
present and evaluate evidence in such a way that the process is seen to be 
transparent by the public. Credibility is gained with difficulty and easily lost. 
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5.0 Methods used to calculate perceived risk 
In Chapter 3 we discussed approaches to the study of perceived risk and acceptable 
risk and noted that the most commonly used approaches are those known as 
revealed preferences and expressed preferences. 
These approaches have been applied in a number of different ways. As stated 
earlier, the method of revealed preferences requires using the analysis of historical 
data to infer preferences. This method is linked primarily with acceptable risk 
studies. The main problem with this approach is that it is very difficult to obtain 
accurate, complete and appropriate data. Several attempts to repeat the early work 
by Starr (1969) and Starr et al. (1976, 1980) failed to duplicate his results. The 
techniques used for this purpose included the analysis of publicly available statistics 
of mortality and basic data analysis techniques. 
In the area of expressed preferences a number of different but related techniques 
have been used, including psychometric scaling, simple social surveys and attitude 
surveys. 
Different groups have tended to associate themselves with particular techniques, for 
example, the work of Fischhoff and Slovic's group at Decision Research, Oregon, is 
primarily in the area of psychometric scaling, with additional information being 
gained from simple social survey questions. Otway and the group from IIASA, 
Austria, have applied the Ajzen and Fishbein attitude survey techniques (and also 
provided good critical comment in other areas as well). 
Some skepticism has been expressed about the results of social surveys of this 
nature, however, as Tait (1988) notes, opinion polls do provide information of value, 
as if they did not, they would not continue to be funded. The difficulty with such 
polls is not in the collecting of the data, but in the approach to interpretation, and 
the level of sophistication of statistical techniques applied. 
The remainder of this Chapter describes some of the specific methods used by 
researchers under the headings of the type of approach used. 
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5.1 Psychometric scaling 
Psychometric techniques are employed with the aim of understanding the probability 
of risk perceptions when these perceptions are extended to quantitative factors such 
as attributes, consequences, seriousness, controllability etc. Participants are asked 
to rate a set of hazards on a range of risk characteristics according to a severity scale. 
In principle, psychometric studies can be used to obtain estimates of perceptions of 
risk sources enabling preferences for risk reduction procedures to be assessed and 
attitudes and perceptions of policy options to be explored. Kraus and Slovic (1988) 
state that these studies have shown that perceived risk is both quantifiable and 
predictable. However, there are severe methodological and practical difficulties 
involved. These are mainly associated with the need to have large samples requiring 
a high level of complexity. Getting people to understand choices means that large 
numbers of questions are required and it is often difficult to get subjects to answer 
the questions. 
Krewski et al (1987) note that the main studies in this area show two systematic 
biases in judgements of frequency. These are: 
(1) individuals overestimate the probability (frequency of 
occurrence) of low probability risks and underestimate the 
frequency of high probability risks; and 
(2) individuals exaggerate the frequency of some specific risks and 
underestimate others. 
The claim is that these errors result from biases relating to the heuristics used by lay 
people to estimate risk. These heuristics were explored by Tversky and Kahnemann 
(1982) and have been discussed by a number of other authors (including Slovic and 
Fischhoff). They are referred to as availability, representativeness and anchoring 
(see Section 4.3). 
One of the problems with interpreting the results of psychometric scaling studies is 
trying to present the results, which often involve 50 or more hazards, and up to 20 
characteristics. There is commonly a great deal of correlation between these 
characteristics and therefore factor analysis is used to analyse the data. This 
statistical technique combines attributes in groups to improve their explanatory 
power. However, the use of factor analysis is itself very subjective depending on the 
groupings selected by the analyst. It draws conclusions which are often unstable and 
which cannot be generalised over populations or risk sources (Otway and Thomas, 
1982). From personal experience we endorse this finding. 
31 
Slovic et al (1986) argue that the approach of Otway and Thomas is unnecessarily 
cynical and that an understanding of how people think about risk is important for 
informing policy even if it cannot answer all questions. They believe that the 
psychometric work done to date provides a beginning of a psychological 
classification system for hazards. 
Psychometric scaling studies are effective at identifying similarities and differences 
between social groups, with respect to risk perceptions. The main feature of the 
perceived risk estimates obtained by this technique is that individuals have shown 
that they are able to effectively estimate risk in terms of statistical risk of mortality 
(when restricted to this) but that when they are asked to make risk estimates with 
greater freedom, their responses reflect wider concerns and other factors (than 
mortality). This point which has been mentioned before needs to be stressed. Risk 
is a compound measure of probability and magnitude. Lay people's estimates of the 
magnitude of risk differ to expert's estimates because of the different factors taken 
into account in the concept of magnitude. On the other hand lay people have shown 
that they can estimate the probability of a particular event occurring quite effectively 
if they are given sufficient (appropriate) information. 
The main area of research in perceptions to date has addressed the question as to 
why risks from some activities are treated differently to risks from other activities, 
examining mean ratings. This question does not address the wider issue of why 
individuals differ in their judgements. An area of omission in the literature is that 
of individual response to single technologies. 
5.2 Social surveys 
Social surveys have been less commonly used than other techniques to examine risk 
perceptions. The reason for this is that responses tend to be generalised and it is 
harder to obtain useful quantitative estimates. They usually involve questioning 
individuals for information about their- perceptions of specified hazards. Typically 
questions on risk perceptions are asked in conjunction with questions on other areas 
of interest. In such cases the risk perception information may be subsidiary to the 
main purpose of the study. 
Lindell and Earle (1983), provide an example of a study designed primarily to gain 
information on risk perceptions. Blackford (1989) used questions on risk 
perceptions as part of a study seeking information on people's expectations and 
perceptions regarding the causes, responsibilities, control and options for flood 
management. A major purpose of the study was to determine people's 
willingness-to-pay for greater flood protection. 
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5.3 Attitude surveys and behavioural intentions 
t'Attitude is the concept commonly used to describe /WW 
people feel about thingstl 
Otway and Thomas, 1982). 
Attitude theory is concerned with the prediction and understanding of human 
behaviour. As Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) point out, there are very many ways of 
measuring an 'attitude' ranging from single responses to complex modelling 
approaches. Thomas (1981) uses the argument that rational choice under 
uncertainty depends on the individual's interpretation of the consequences and that 
risks issues are usually perceived, not in isolation but along with perceptions of 
possible benefit, to suggest a convergence with attitude theory as described by 
Fishbein and Ajzen (1975). This claim is based on the grounds that the approach 
provides a conceptual framework and a methodology for studying the ways that 
individuals view the world. 
Using the terminology of Fishbein and Ajzen, and considering risk perception as an 
attitude, salient determinants are beliefs (subjective probabilities) about hazards. A 
belief represents the cognitive images that a person possesses about a given object or 
the association between an 'attitude object' and an attribute (tithe use of coal leads to 
air pollutiontt, Thomas, 1981). It is a probability judgement whether the attribute is 
or is not associated with the perception of an object. A strength of belief is the 
probability the individual assigns to the association. 
Ajzen and Fishbein (1980) model a relationship between attitudes, strength of belief 
and salient beliefs (evaluations of beliefs within the individual's span of attention at 
anyone time). 
Otway's group at IIASA used this approach in the late 1970s as a means of 
researching people's perceptions about energy systems. It involved open-ended 
interviews where people were asked to scale their attitudes towards five energy 
systems and 39 attributes (or consequences) which were associated with a set of 39 
belief statements. Respondents were then asked to rate the 'truth' of each of these 
belief statements. Fishbein was himself directly involved with this work. 
It is possible to use mailed questionnaires for this approach, but the best results are 
obtained from personal interviews. In the Austrian example, interviews were used 
and considerable explanation had to be given on how the rating scale worked. This 
is common to most such studies which means that the time required to perform even 
a moderate study is very lengthy. The statistical analysis techniques are complex 
and factor analysis is sometimes used as well. 
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A major criticism of the Fishbein and Ajzen approach is that beliefs are aggregated 
and community attitudes are derived modally. The shortcoming here is that 
individuals are most likely to give different weightings to the 'basket' of beliefs that 
they are evaluating and that this is not taken account of in the aggregation process. 
However, the questionnaire techniques applied by Ajzen and Fishbein are generally 
very useful, and can be combined with other approaches to give useful results. 
5.4 Other methods 
New techniques for deriving information about risk perceptions are being studied. 
Tait (1988) refers to the "common theme" of these approaches as being firstly "the 
need to find ways of getting respondents to provide information in their own way", 
and secondly, "the need to analyse the data in such a way as to allow valid 
generalisations to be drawn". Taped interviews are being explored as an approach 
to the former. 
The multidimensional scaling technique developed by Vlek and Stallen is an analysis 
technique which produces a multidimensional spatial mapping of relationships. 
This was used by Lee (1981a) to compare different hazards or sets of people ona 
range of dimensions. In this example, Lee was analysing the perceptions of two 
groups of people towards sporting activities. The analysis is referred to as 
multidimensional scalogram analysis (Lingoes, 1973). Johnson and Tversky (1986) 
compared factor analysis and similarly presented material derived from a set of 18 
hazards. They found that the space obtained from multidimensional scaling 
differed from the factor analytic space. 
Contingent valuation (Bishop and Heberlein, 1985) risk-related studies have been 
used to consider values for one or two hazards. One of the difficulties with 
contingent valuation (in common with other techniques discussed here) is in 
presenting the data in a suitably simple form for people to understand sufficiently to 
enable them to make informed responses. People are asked how much they would 
be willing-to-pay (or willing-to-accept) if a particular activity were allowed to go 
ahead. In typical non-market valuations a respondent might be asked how much he 
would be willing-to-pay for a recreational resource to remain in its natural state. 
Demand curves are derived from the individual information gained. Intuitively this 
would appear to be a good way of getting around the need to aggregate individual 
perceptions to obtain societal estimates of perceived risk. In practise the estimates 
obtained seldom provide more than upper or lower bounds to the problem. 
Analysis of variance has been used occasionally in a limited fashion for modelling 
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perceptions of individuals. The first example reported is Slovic and Lichtenstein 
(1971). A further example appears in Anderson (1981). Results give sets of 
across-hazard and inter-hazard combinations for comparison. The main limitation 
is that sometimes the analysis gives combinations that do not exist in reality. The 
method works if all the characteristics of the hazard are included, but this is 
obviously difficult to ensure. A further limitation is that people are asked to judge 
abstract profiles which may have little real meaning. However the approach does 
force people to look at risk in association with a defined set of characteristics in a 
similar way to psychometric surveys and attitude studies. 
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6.0 Acceptable risk 
(or how safe is safe enough?) 
Definitions 
"What is an acceptable risk? WJw determines it? And how 
do they do it?" 
(Greenberg, 1984) 
"The acceptable level is the level which is 'good enough: 
where 'good enough' means that you think the advantages 
of increased safety are not worth the costs of reducing risk 
by restricting or otherwise altering the activity." 
(Fischhoff, Slovic et al., 1978) 
"The occurrence of risk in the past is not evidence of 
acceptability. . .. There never was any historical or social 
'acceptability' of risk (in the workplace) .... current 
levels of risk represent the best bargain organised labour 
can achieve at any given time." 
(Samuels, 1979) 
"Law cannot determine acceptable risk. Acceptable risk is 
a socioeconomic political question. A better means of 
determining acceptable risk would benefit the legal system 
but must derive from social process." 
(Green, 1979). 
Acceptable risk is based on the assumption that "there is a 
non zero level of probability of occurrence of an accident 
below which the public as a whole is willing to accept the 
risk; at this level there will be no bar to direct involvement 
or endorsement of the activity". 
(Royal Society, 1983) 
"In a democracy, no program can survive long without 
general public acceptability.. .. public perception that the 
program is undesirable can eliminate it. " 
(Lave, 1984) 
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"Risk acceptance reflects the results of balancing positive 
and negative consequences and their probabilities by 
forming a general evaluative judgement of the riskiness of 
a certain object or activity. II 
(Renn and Swaton, 1984) 
This series of definitions represents a number of ways in which risk researchers have 
attempted to characterise acceptable risk. The first characterisation of acceptable 
risk derived from Starr's work with the revealed preference method. His results 
gave the first explicit recognition of acceptable risk. 
None of the definitions is complete. Previously we suggested that perceived risk has 
three elements: awareness, knowledge and values. It should be noted that the only 
researcher who does not assume knowledge (and implicitly awareness) is Lave 
(1984). Many risks are accepted in ignorance of the existence and value of the risk. 
Fischhoff, Lichtenstein et al. (1981) modified their earlier definition (above) by 
saying that acceptable risk is a useful descriptor for a type of decision-making 
process but that it is not appropriate as a term to describe the results of the process. 
That is, risks are not acceptable but options are. 
One of the things that most of these definitions have in common is that they refer to 
acceptable risk in the context of a decision process. This moves away from some of 
the earlier descriptions where acceptable risk was thought of as an independent 
concept which could be transferred or compared fairly straightforwardly between 
different types of activities. 
Early discussions of the concept of acceptable risk centre around whether it existed 
or not. In 1979, Rowe (Goodman and Rowe, 1979) described a set of conditions 
which he believed supported the existence of acceptable risk. They are: 
(1) risk that is perceived to be so small as to be deemed negligible; 
(2) risk that is uncontrollable or unavoidable without major 
disruption in lifestyle; 
(3) acceptable risk levels established by a credible organisation with 
responsibility for health and safety; 
(4) historical levels of risk that continue to be acceptable; and 
(5) risk that is deemed worth the benefits by the risk taker. 
He refers to these respectively as the threshold condition, the status quo, the 
regulatory condition, the de facto condition and the voluntary balance condition. 
This illustrates the fact that acceptable risk is certainly not a single dimensioned 
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concept. We do not believe, however, that these conditions necessarily support the 
existence of acceptable risk. The types of risks referred to here can also be termed 
'accepted', 'necessary', 'unavoidable' or 'tolerated' risks and these are discussed later 
in this Chapter. 
Gough (1988a) describes some of the work by Rothschild and Inhaber. A section of 
that report is repeated here to illustrate some of the early approaches to acceptable 
risk which are no longer considered appropriate. Rothschild (1978) reported in the 
Listener, implied that the concept of acceptability must be related to other risks 
which are implicitly accepted by individuals. He sets his acceptable risk explicitly at 
1:7500 per year of exposure, using car accidents in 1974 as a reference point. His 
approach was based on work by Inhaber (19781 and 1981), and the Rasmussen 
report (United States Atomic Energy Commission, 1974). In a similar manner the 
Rasmussen report confidently predicted that nuclear accidents will occur at a rate of 
1 in 1,000,000 for accidents involving 1000 or more fatalities (based on a group of 
100 reactors) and goes on to equate this to the risk of a meteor striking a major 
United States city and causing the same number of casualties. 
This work has been severely criticised on a number of grounds. The criticism has 
highlighted the difficulties involved in transferring risk acceptance from one activity 
to another without taking account of the factors involved in risk perceptions, and the 
implicit subjectivity attached to the perceptions of different types of risk. 
Rothschild, Rasmussen and Inhaber have shown an alarming dependance on 
statistics derived from quite questionable sources, and have disregarded the need to 
quantify risk with regard to all the factors involved in risk magnitude. These 
numbers are quite meaningless in terms of the risks faced by individuals and groups 
as part of their everyday existence. 
6.1 What is acceptable risk? 
In the remainder of this publication we consider acceptable risk determination as a 
decision process of which the outcome is a benchmark which risk analysts, regulators 
and managers may use to measure the risk of an activity against. 
If we adopt the tenet that the determination of acceptable risk is a type of 
decision-making process (in the same way as risk assessment) but not a product of 
1Inhaber (1981) is a revised version of Inhaber (1978), a limited circulation publication 
which is not readily available. 
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that process, we are proposing that once a hazard or potential harm has been 
identified then a decision must be made as to which level, if any, should be allowed 
to persist, or be deemed 'acceptable'. Related to this are equity issues revolving 
around the distribution of risks and benefits and the question of 'acceptable to 
whom?' 
We know that different groups define and use the concept of acceptable risk in 
different ways. For example: 
(1) risk analysts seek to define acceptable risk; 
(2) risk regulators use the risk analysts information and apply social 
criteria and judgements to establish acceptable risk levels for 
society; 
(3) managers try to match their processes to the levels set by the 
regulators; and 
(4) the public at large struggle to understand levels of acceptable 
risk imposed on them and to match these with those levels that 
they derive from their own perception of the risk. 
Risks exist in our society and are 'accepted' under different circumstances. This 
has, in the past, led people to believe in the existence of a (universal) acceptable 
level of risk. We have already mentioned that some proponents of acceptable risk 
believe in a single risk measure that, with minor adjustments, can be used to cover all 
risk. Other analysts recognise that the factors affecting perceived risk, and thus 
acceptable risk, mean that risks are viewed differently in terms of acceptability. For 
example, a single measure of acceptability in terms of numbers of deaths or injuries 
is not acceptable to the public and nor is it desirable. 
The term 'acceptable risk' itself requires amplification. Risks are 'accepted' (or 
become acceptable) under different circumstances according to people's perceptions 
of the risk (a fact not recognised by Rothschild and Inhaber). Estimated levels of 
(technical) risk that are unacceptable in the workplace (by workers) may be 
commonly accepted by the same people in their private life. 
People apparently voluntarily accept comparatively high risks of death and injury by 
driving cars on holiday weekends, but again, apparently irrationally oppose the siting 
of LPG facilities (on paper a much safer consideration). 
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In both these cases, applying the availability heuristic we could say that factors 
affecting perceived risk and acceptable risk are the voluntary nature of the activities, 
the dread aspect, the catastrophic consequence (in the latter case), fear of the 
unknown and other motivations not necessarily associated with risk. 
A number of alternative descriptors for some of these types of 'acceptable' risk have 
been developed, which reflect more accurately the characteristics of the particular 
hazard. These descriptors include 'accepted' risk, 'necessary' risk, 'tolerable' risk 
and 'unknown' risk. They are not altogether uniquely defined, and there are 
overlaps between some of them. They are useful in that they provide a way of 
looking at the concept of 'acceptable' risk according to some of the social factors 
associated with the type of risk being considered. 
6.1.1 Accepted risk 
In our everyday life we meet, face and apparently accept risks all the time. This fact 
has been used by authors such as Inhaber, Rothschild and Rasmussen as evidence 
for the existence of acceptable risk. What they have ignored is that these risks or 
hazards which we encounter have certain characteristics which are evaluated by 
individuals and groups when considering risk. We have previously discussed the 
probability and magnitude aspects of risk. The characteristics of the magnitude of 
the consequences of risk are the size, the timing and the extent of the potential 
harm. In attempting to define an acceptable risk, the above authors have considered 
only the probability aspect of the measure. They have not considered the hazard or 
the social context of the magnitude component. 
Earlier, we suggested that there is no such thing as an acceptable risk, and that 
options are acceptable, but outcomes are not. When individuals evaluate risk they 
do so on the basis of societal preferences and the outcome of this process is accepted 
risk, where the perceived personal benefits are seen to outweigh the perceived risks. 
40 
6.1.2 Necessary risk 
Necessary risk is related to accepted risk. It is incurred when consideration is given 
to additional socio-economic factors such as employment, income or age. Necessary 
risk is risk which is considered unavoidable because of these factors or because it is 
not possible to reduce the risk. 
The political process is a very important part of necessary risk and accepted risk. 
Decision makers are faced with the responsibility of judging that a particular risk 
level is necessary for certain socially desirable conditions to be met. 
6.1.3 Tolerable risk 
Tolerable risk depends primarily on the idea of the benefits outweighing the risks. 
The risk will never be accepted, but it will be tolerated for a particular activity or for 
a specified time period. 
Moore (1988) describes the term 'tolerable risk' as originating from the Sizewell B 
Inquiry in Britain. "A tolerable risk is not the same as an acceptable risk as people 
may tolerate a certain level of danger associated with a particular risk but that does 
not mean they will ever accept it." The term derives from comments by Sir Frank 
Layfield Q.C. (1987) that "although acceptable risk is often used in balancing risks 
and benefits, it does not adequately convey the reluctance with which possible 
substantial risks and benefits may be tolerated". 
Tolerable risk therefore indicates that people judge the benefits from accepting a 
particular risk to be sufficient to outweigh the potential costs. This risk may be 
considerably higher in absolute terms than an individual or group would be prepared 
to tolerate under different circumstances. Usually such risk is associated with a 
specific time period (such as air travel) or socio-economic factors such as the lack of 
viable options for work (also implying a fIXed time period after which the individual 
expects to be able to leave). 
If decision makers wish to use tolerable risk to best advantage they must be prepared 
to provide the public (or the group at risk) with full information about the operation 
of the activity, safety measures and areas of uncertainty. 
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J'Riordan (1987) also pursues the line of tolerable risk and suggests that the 
:onventional approach to tolerable risk rests on four basic principles: 
(1) ignorance in terms of which risks are known and which are not; 
(2) the de Minimis principle which states that residual dangers will 
be tolerable if there is no better approach and if the process 
through which this is accepted are transparent, accessible and 
accountable; 
(3) the comparison test that dangers are tolerated if they are seen to 
be lower than other familiar processes; and 
(4) the justification test which relates benefits to dangers. 
6.1.4 Unknown or apparently acceptable risk 
Uncertainty is a very important factor in the consideration of acceptable risk and risk 
comparisons. Some apparently 'accepted' risks are totally unknown or unsuspected. 
The classic example used to illustrate this type of risk is the case of the Love Canal 
in New York State, where development took place on the site of a disused chemical 
dump as a result of inadequate monitoring. The people living in the area were 
subjected to considerable risk from chemical poisoning until public concern finally 
forced the issue to the surface. Further evidence to hand from British experience is 
beginning to suggest that there is a danger of leukemia from very low levels of 
radiation which have previously been considered harmless: levels such as might be 
experienced by people living in close proximity to nuclear power plants. There is 
also the current concern linking cancer in children to radiation absorbed by their 
fathers working in high radiation areas in nuclear power plants (The Press, 1990). 
Unknown risks change character as their presence becomes known. 
6.1.5 Safety 
"Safety is a thing of the past, a thing is safe if its risks are 
judged to be acceptable. " 
(Lowrance, 1976) 
When scientists use the term 'safe' to describe a risky situation, they are doing is 
describing 'permitted' (accepted) or 'tolerated' levels of risk. Safety cannot be 
measured in this context. Risk can be measured on a statistical basis, but safety is a 
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matter of judgement (as seen in the risk assessment process, Section 6.3). What we 
mean by this is that safety is a relative concept, usually dealing with people in 
particular situations. When we talk about the safety of a building or the safety of a 
bridge we are talking about the relative risks of that building or bridge failing. 
The concept of levels of risk leads to the relationship between acceptable risk and 
safety. So far, we have deliberately avoided the use of the terms 'safe' and 'safety' 
because they carry an implicit reassurance of 'absoluteness'. In practice, safety is a 
subjective, relative measure which is a function of risk management. The 
determination of a 'safe' level of exposure is equivalent to setting an acceptable level 
of risk. 
6.1.6 Threshold conditions 
In recent years the determination of acceptable risk has turned towards the 
development of quantitative models which are used to set numerical levels below 
which any estimated risk is said to be acceptable. These levels are known as 
thresholds, and for health risks they are commonly derived from dose-response 
studies using either animals or humans. For technological hazards such as nuclear 
power and LPG installations, where raw data is not readily obtainable, the process is 
more difficult and uncertain. 
In some definitions, a threshold is described as the level of exposure or toxicity 
below which there is no harm to humans. This is in fact quite different to the 
definition that involves an acceptable level of risk, but the two are sometimes used 
interchangeably. 
The question in most cases is whether a threshold involving a level of no harm in fact 
exists. Animal tests are very expensive and time consuming, particularly at low 
levels of exposure or toxicity. They also pose increasingly complex ethical 
questions. Therefore, in most cases models are used to extrapolate (simple straight 
line extrapolation is common). Current thinking suggests that these approaches are 
not valid and that there is no evidence to support them. 
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6.2 Acceptable risk and perceived risk 
The discussion of different ways in which we can look at acceptable and accepted 
risk has demonstrated that acceptable risk and perceived risk are not different types 
of risk. Perceived risk has been defined as "that risk seen intuitively by individuals". 
Perceived risk is thus an estimate of real risk. Acceptable risk on the other hand has 
been described as a descriptor for a type of process "but not the product of that 
process". Perceived risk influences the acceptable risk decision-making process and 
provides one criterion for evaluation of the risk. Perceived risk is also a determinant 
of accepted risk, necessary risk and tolerable risk, which are outputs from the 
decision process also. 
Acceptable risk depends on perceived risk and perceived benefit. Its determination 
requires a balance of risks and benefits in the marketplace. In considering whether 
acceptable risk exists as a unique entity, Fischhoff~ Slovic et at. (1978), state that 
people do not believe that this state of balance has been achieved. 
6.3 Acceptable risk and risk assessment 
Gough (1988a) stated that the determination of acceptable risk is an integral part of 
the process of risk assessment. Acceptable risk problems are decision problems 
because they require a choice between different courses of action, but they differ 
from other decision problems in that one of the available alternatives involves as a 
consequence, a threat to life or health. This threat may be either direct, with 
obvious consequences, or indirect, being a threat to something that we value as a 
part of our quality of life. 
Risk assessment has two main components: risk determination (identification and 
estimation) and risk evaluation. Risk evaluation involves societal evaluations of the 
acceptability of the risk options. Therefore acceptable risk decision making is a part 
of risk assessment. 
Samuels (1979) puts this slightly differently, stating that there are two separate but 
legitimate issues with respect to acceptable risk: 
(1) the measurement of risk; and 
(2) the determination of acceptability. 
Of these, the first is an empirical judgement and the second is an ideological 
judgement. 
44 
Setting acceptable risk levels can be seen as equivalent to the risk assessment 
process. Firstly, the risks need to be identified, secondly they need to be estimated 
and thirdly they need to be evaluated against society's values, beliefs and aspirations. 
The first two steps of this process involve the analyst or scientist and the third step is 
a political or ideological judgement as described by Samuels. 
Once we have identified a hazard (or possible adverse outcome) and estimated the 
risk we must then determine whether it is socially acceptable and if so, at what level. 
But in considering this the analyst is no longer working as a scientist. This type of 
decision should be made through the political process. Rall and Niehs (1980) stress 
that this decision should be based upon scientific data and clearly articulated social 
and economic values. 
The product of risk assessment is therefore a collection of information about the 
effects of an activity from which analysts and regulators (politicians) are required to 
determine a level of 'acceptable' risk for that specific activity or situation. This is 
particularly applicable in the area of health hazard where risk assessment is used 
often in conjunction with animal tests to assess the risk to humans from particular 
chemicals or toxic agents that the public is exposed to either in the workplace or 
through their environment. In the United States, a number of government agencies 
perform and fund research in these areas of toxic effects. One of the main 
difficulties is that to date this type of risk assessment model has only been developed 
for cancer (Greenberg, 1984). 
Risk assessment and the establishment of acceptable risk levels (through regulatory 
processes) generally involve recourse to political decision-making processes. Some 
of the literature suggests that the two can be divorced, and that risk assessment is a 
scientific process and acceptable risk is a political issue (Clarke, 1988). Where risk 
issues are involved this is generally incorrect. Risk assessment is, and should be, 
politically influenced. 
6.4 Acceptable risk and risk management 
Risk management is the implementation phase of the risk assessment process. It 
involves communicating the decision to analysts, management and the public and 
putting in place the institutional and managerial arrangements required. If the risk 
assessment decision process determines a level of risk that is considered acceptable 
for the situation being studied, then a further part of risk management is the process 
which monitors the results of implementation and reports back to the decision 
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making body as to its effectiveness. Risk management within an organisation or 
operation also involves seeking ways of reducing risks (risk mitigation). 
Lave (1984) lists the following criteria as relevant for evaluating risk management 
strategies: 
(1) level of residual risk; 
(2) efficiency in risk reduction; 
(3) administrative simplicity; 
(4) equity; and 
(5) public acceptability. 
The task of risk management then is to ensure that risks remain between the 
boundaries defined as acceptable. As Lave points out, the first four of these criteria 
may be met and yet if the fifth (public acceptability) is not, then conflict will occur. 
The determination of risk levels that are 'acceptable to the public' is crucial. 
Current policy in the United States is to separate risk assessment and risk 
management. In this case, the challenge for the risk assessor is to communicate "all 
the information needed by the risk manager in such a way that its implications will 
be readily understood" (Paustenbach, 1989). The reasoning behind this separation 
is probably an attempt to ensure the independence of the risk assessment process. 
The difficulty, as pointed out by Paustenbach is that unless the communication 
process is given very careful attention then the risk manager may be unaware of 
information critical to the correct operation of the system. 
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7.0 Methods used for calculating acceptable risk 
In this discussion we have been looking at acceptable risk and its relationship to 
perceived risk and risk perceptions. In Chapter 3 we looked at the different 
approaches that have been taken to the study of perceived risk and acceptable risk 
and noted that revealed preferences had been used by Starr to infer the existence of 
acceptable risk and some estimates of value. 
Discussion of acceptable risk then concentrated on the concept of acceptable risk 
determination as a decision process. We also looked at alternative concepts such as 
accepted risk, necessary risk and tolerable risk, which are more appropriate than 
acceptable risk in many cases. 
Acceptable risk is not the product of the acceptable risk decision process. The 
product is an acceptable option or a benchmark against which analysts and managers 
can measure levels of risk. It is applicable only in the specific context in which it is 
determined. 
In recent years, the determination of acceptable risk has turned towards the 
development of quantitative models which are used to set numerical levels below 
which an estimated risk is said to be acceptable. A common approach is to place 
'known' risks on a scale and to rate the acceptability of 'new' risks by estimating their 
equivalent numerical value and placing them alongside this scale. 
In his classic paper, Rowe (1980) lists four methods for assessing risk. All of these 
approaches are used for the setting of acceptable risk levels. Fischhoff et ai. (1980) 
describe them as follows: 
(1) risk aversion, which involves the maximum reduction of risk 
possible with little or no comparison with other risks or with 
benefits, of which standards of zero tolerance and 
dose-consequence threshold levels are examples; 
(2) risk balancing (corresponding to Rowe's risk comparison 
method), assumes that some level of risk above zero is 
acceptable and defines the level through comparison with 
appropriate reference cases, such as similar technologies, natural 
background levels or risk previously determined to be 
acceptable; 
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(3) cost effectiveness (of risk reduction), seeks to maximise the 
reduction of risk for each dollar expenditure on safety -
acceptable risk may be set by breaks in the slope of risk 
reduction efficiency for a given hazard or by allocating public 
funds among hazards for maximum risk reduction to society as a 
whole; 
(4) cost(-risk)-benefit balancing, recognises some level of risk above 
zero, acceptable risk is defined by balancing the benefits of an 
activity or technology against the level of risk it presents - the 
risk tolerated increases proportionately with the magnitude of 
the benefits involved. 
None of these approaches provides an adequate solution to the question of risk 
acceptability and it must be remembered that risk to human health is only one value 
dimension of acceptability; a variety of other considerations (equity, impact upon 
institutions, ecological impacts) may assume greater importance in any given case. 
Also, societal values change and what is viewed as being safe today may be viewed as 
being unsafe tomorrow (as previously discussed with regard to the setting of limits 
on occupation levels of radiation). 
There is a clear difference between setting levels of acceptable risk for specific 
circumstances and determining acceptable risk in general terms. Acceptable risk 
levels are the product of the acceptable risk decision-making process, and they are 
acceptable only in terms of the process involved in their determination and the social 
evaluation associated with it. Judgements on acceptability involve the 
consideration of perceived risks and benefits in the light of feasible alternatives. 
Moving therefore from these 'objective' approaches to the setting of acceptable risk 
levels we enter the area of psychometric risk acceptance analyses. The shortcomings 
of the objective approaches are that they do not take full account of the dimensions 
of risk which include: the temporal limits, who is affected, how people respond to 
reduce risk, the difference between accepted and acceptable risk, and the way in 
which individuals arrive at decisions. Psychometric and sociological studies that 
estimate perceived risk increase our understanding of how particular benefits are 
seen by individuals and specific groups. 
Starr (1969) and Starr et al. (1976) reject the disregarding of any risk below a 
particular level and claim that models should take account of tradeoffs between risk 
options to establish risk benefit tradeoffs. Their approach involves the use of 
revealed preferences. Otway and Cohen (1975) followed this approach but were 
unable to duplicate Starr's results and concluded that the methodology and results 
were very sensitive to the assumptions made and the data used. Starr, himself, put a 
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great many provisos on his results. The use of revealed preferences and expressed 
preferences to improve understanding of risk perceptions has been discussed in 
Chapter 3. 
Part of the process of determining a level of acceptable risk involves examining the 
difference between people's perceived risk and the technologist's estimated risk. As 
there is no obvious way of dealing with these differences it is perhaps useful to look 
at ways in which we can measure perceptions as a means of better understanding the 
way in which these differences arise. 
People do not necessarily reject technical risk estimates. Macgregor and Slovic 
(1986) looked at the perceived acceptability of three different approaches to making 
safety decisions. They were cost-benefit analysis, risk analysis (including 
quantitative risk assessment) and the setting of standards (regulation). The 
expected value risk analysis was judged the most acceptable method and industry 
standards (because of the non obvious basis of the decisions made on acceptability 
or safety) was the least acceptable. The reason for the preference for the risk 
analysis approach was that the methodology could be clearly seen and the approach 
understood. The lesson for risk analysts is that transparency of process is critical to 
the credibility of the decision-making process and hence the acceptability of the 
decision. 
7.1 Risk aversion 
The risk aversion approach to setting acceptable risk levels attempts to reduce risk 
as much as possible. There is no attempt to compare risks and benefits. The main 
difficulty with this approach is that it is really not possible to eliminate risk entirely, 
and because of the lack of anything to compare the residual risk against, it is difficult 
to make any judgement as to the efficacy of the approach in a particular 
circumstance. 
The use of dose-consequence studies to set thresholds of acceptable risk is a 
particular application of this approach. Threshold levels of risk are set, below 
which it is considered that the level of risk is effectively zero. The major difficulty 
is that the methods used to set these threshold levels usually require extrapolation 
from measured higher dose-response levels to these very low levels. In specific 
circumstances it has been found that these extrapolations may be quite inaccurate. 
The particular example of current concern is the case of exposure to very low level 
radiation. Low levels of exposure previously considered 'safe' have recently been 
shown to have potentially dangerous effects. 
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This type of extrapolation is necessary because it is virtually impossible to construct 
credible experiments for very low levels of exposure. Such experiments require 
very large numbers of experimental subjects thus incurring high costs in terms of 
time and money. 
7.2 Risk comparisons 
As Whipple (1986) points out, Irone basic way to consider the acceptability of a risk is 
to compare it with other risks". 
The risk comparison approach to setting acceptable risk levels involves setting 
maximum and minimum levels of risk using known and accepted risk levels as a scale 
of reference. The 'new' risk is then estimated and deemed acceptable or 
unacceptable according to where it lies on this risk scale. 
Risk comparison was the approach used by Rothschild to determine the acceptability 
of nuclear power. He compared the calculated risk of a nuclear power plant 
explosion with the risk of death on the road. This illustrates the care which must be 
taken when using risk comparisons to assess acceptability. It is very important that 
the 'new' risk being examined is compared with an appropriate reference risk with 
similar characteristics. This is essential for public acceptance of the estimated 
'riskiness' of the new activity. 
Risk comparison is a form of extrapolation and there are a number of obvious 
difficulties associated with its use. As we have already statedt tbe setting of any 
acceptable risk level involves a number of value judgements. If objective risk 
estimates and referents are used, there is considerable subjectivity involved (even 
ignoring the problems of taking account of aU aspects of magnitude). There is a 
danger that the risk analyst and expert may forget the subjective nature of "objective" 
estimates. 
Risk comparisons can be useful, particularly when the risks being compared have 
similar characteristics, but it is important to recognise that comparing risks that 
totally dissimilar in nature is dangerous. Risks can be measured in a lot of different 
ways and reflect a lot of different attitudes (in terms of perceptions). Individual 
risks must be treated differently to group risks. Some risks have characteristics 
which expectation and individual risk measures fail to capture and it must be born in 
mind that risks are not acceptable, but technologies or processes are. 
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7.3 Cost effectiveness of risk reduction 
Cost-effectiveness analysis is used to compare alternative means of achieving the 
same reduction in risk. Risk-cost comparisons are used to compare the relative 
costs of risk reduction either by controlling a substance at different levels or by 
reducing alternative types of risks. Typically, measures of cost include dollar per 
life or dollar per accident avoided. Estimates of risk must therefore also be 
expressed in the same units. This is sometimes difficult to achieve. 
In common with the risk comparison method, different types of risks cannot be 
compared. 
7.4 Cost-risk-benefit analysis 
Cost-benefit analysis provides an accounting framework for evaluating and 
comparing projects, but it does not directly provide insight into the acceptability of 
risk values (Starr and Whipple, 1980). 
Cost-benefit analysis can be used to assess acceptable risk. It is, however, more 
commonly used in the form of risk-benefit analysis where risks are'accounted as 
costs. Lay people judging acceptability have been shown to use a form of individual 
risk-benefit assessment where they compare their perceived risk against their 
perceived benefit. 
Risk-benefit analysis suffers from the same limitations as cost-benefit analysis, 
foremost of which is the problem of equity. The major unsolved problem in 
calculating risks and benefits is the reconciliation of the differences between the 
individual, group and societal perspectives (Engelmann and Renn, 1979). As a 
result of this divergence, rational decisions at each of these levels are not necessarily 
consistent. This is because of the distribution of direct and indirect risks and 
benefits, which returns us to the problems of NIMBY ('not in my back yard') and 
NIABY ('not in anybody's back yard'). 
Starr suggests that risk-benefit analysis can be used in particular situations for the 
allocation of resources for safety, where a fixed budget is available for risk 
reduction, the setting of standards (or performance targets) and in societal 
risk-taking decisions where the level of decision making is quite specific. 
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The problem with units becomes more apparent when you realise that people make 
individual judgements of acceptability by weighing up the perceived risks and 
benefits without needing to quantify their estimates, let alone worry about 
commensurate units. For decision making at a group or societal level more explicit 
accounting is required. 
7.5 Equity issues 
The question of equity was introduced in Section 7.4, but it is important enough to 
require re-iteration. In any form of cost-benefit analysis or cost-risk-benefit 
balancing exercise, a major area of concern is equity. Many risk decisions involve 
situations where the distribution of the risks and benefits is such that the benefits 
accrue to one societal group while the costs are borne by another. A simple 
example is that of a chemical plant that produces noxious fumes. The benefits 
accrue to the company and indirectly to the consumers of the products produced 
while the costs are born virtually entirely by the residents adjacent to the plant. 
As Engelmann and Renn (1979) point out, "the rational decision of the individual or 
of a group is not necessarily consistent with the rational decision of society". They 
list four reasons for this: 
n(1) the direct benefit and the direct cost are of little relevance to the 
individual citizen; 
(2) the indirect advantages and disadvantages are of immediate 
significance to the adjacent citizens; 
(3) (as a rule) the indirect advantages and disadvantages are not 
equal1y distributed; and 
(4) the altruistic cost and benefit considerations of the individual 
citizens of a group will not necessarily be in conformity." 
As a means of reconciling these different viewpoints, they recommend a three-stage 
process of individual, intermediate (group) and social cost-benefit evaluation, 
combined in a dynamic, interactive framework. This is a complex solution which is 
unlikely to prove practical in most real-world situations. 
Acceptable risk depends upon who will be affected in terms of costs and benefits. 
The dilemma becomes not what is an acceptable risk, but what is a fair or equitable 
risk? To whom is the risk acceptable: the policy makers, or those who have to bear 
the risk? How can we increase the fairness of risk? 
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One of the more interesting studies in this area is reported by Fischhoff, Slovic et al. 
(1978) where psychometric techniques were used to elicit estimates of perceived 
risk, acceptable risk and perceived benefit. The study group was an educated 
informed section of the League of Women Voters. The most interesting result was 
the consistent relationship between perceived benefit and an acceptable level of risk. 
This is consistent with our early conclusion that you cannot separate determination 
of acceptable risk from the expected benefit. 
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8.0 Implications for risk perception research. 
One conclusion of Slovic's work in the area of risk perceptions (Slovic, Lichtenstein 
et aI., 1979) is that lay people need to be better informed, to rely less on unexamined 
and unsupported judgement, to be aware of the qualitative aspects that condition 
risk judgements and to be open to new evidence. Experts need to recognise their 
cognitive limitations, to temper assessments with the qualitative aspects that temper 
lay judgments and to somehow create ways in which this modifying process can find 
expression in hazard management. 
This review of the literature includes an examination of perceived risk and 
acceptable risk and a discussion of the approaches and specific techniques which 
have been used to study and measure these concepts. Individual researchers are 
optimistic about the results they have achieved and have used these results to 
support the case for continuing research in the area Some concern about the way in 
which the results of this work have been used have been expressed by other 
researchers. There is no doubt, however, that differences between lay perceptions 
of risk and expert predictions of risk do exist, and that these differences affect the 
way in which individuals and groups react towards risk: whether they accept it, 
tolerate it or consider it necessary. If we wish to improve the risk decision-making 
process and to reduce conflict in environmental decision making, then the more 
information we can give decision makers about the way people respond to risk the 
better. 
8.1 Changing attitudes towards perceived risk. 
In 1979, General Motors held a symposium entitled "Societal.risk assessment: how 
safe is safe enough?". In one of the papers reported from this symposium, Kasper 
(1979b) presented some conclusions about risk decision making. He stated that it 
was unlikely that calculated and perceived risk measures would ever co-incide, but 
suggested changes to the decision-making process to "make things easier". These 
were firstly a change in attitude, which recognises that not only the public needs to 
change, but that experts need to work at improving their image so that they are 
believed again. Secondly, he proposed a change in the process of decision-making 
so that all affected parties should be included as early as possible. 
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What is important about these two recommendations is not what they say, but that 
whilst they appear imminently reasonable and sensible, their message is still as 
relevant today as it was ten years ago. The discussion reported at that time was 
interesting in that it basically consisted of experts hotly defending their own records, 
thus re-inforcing the necessity for the first recommendation. 
At a later meeting of the Royal Society on the assessment and perception of risk in 
1981 (Warner and Slater, 1981), participants supported the suggestion that greater 
credibility should be given to perceived risk and risk perceptions, and expressed the 
belief that this was in fact occurring. Prior to that time there had been a general 
feeling amongst experts that lay people were unable to understand technological 
risks and that therefore they should not be involved in decisions about risk. Risk 
perceptions were treated as 'irrational' and irrelevant. However, despite the 
inception of this welcome, apparent change in attitude, progress over the past eight 
years has been slow, and the development of ways to incorporate public perceptions 
has proved difficult. 
8.2 Limitations of current research 
Covello (1983), in a survey of perceived risk literature, suggested that there were 
three major limitations in the perceived risk literature, namely that: 
(1) most studies focus on individual and not group perceptions of 
risk; 
(2) few studies have examined the relationship between risk 
perception and actual behaviour (i.e. response to hazard); and 
(3) few attempts have been made to relate the literature on risk 
perception to the literature on the perceived risks of natural 
hazards. 
In the same paper, Covello made a number of points about the limitations of the risk 
perception studies that he reviewed. These can be summarised as that: 
(1) most reported findings are based on studies of small, select, 
unrepresentative groups; 
(2) there has been little work on the influence of organisational and 
social structure factors on risk perceptions; 
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(3) risk perception studies in common with nearly all survey 
research are subject to biases connected with the way people 
respond and the way in which the questionnaire is constructed; 
(4) there have been few attempts to relate actual response with 
reported perceptions; and 
(5) few attempts have been made to relate technological risk 
perceptions with natural hazard perceptions. 
This review was written in 1983, shortly after major controversy between risk 
researchers, sparked by a paper in Risk Analysis by Otway and Thomas (1982). This 
latter paper adopted a cynical view of research into risk perceptions and suggested 
that motives behind some of this research may have political overtones (Section 8.3, 
and Appendix D). 
The points made by Covello are not necessarily criticisms. They are observations 
which need to be kept in mind when evaluating the work done by risk researchers. It 
should, however, be noted that very little subsequent work has been done to rectify 
the deficiencies identified here. 
A further important point made by Covello (1983), which is very relevant to the New 
Zealand situation, is that most of the research on risk perceptions has centred 
around controversy over the use of nuclear power. The main feature of this debate 
has been that the conflict is generally a value conflict as opposed to an interest 
conflict, which is unlikely to be resolved by increased information. In New Zealand 
we need to be aware of these differences between the types of conflict that are likely 
to arise. 
In the area of risk conflicts, the use of surrogates is a common feature. Conflicts 
presented as interest based may prove to be value based, with issues clouded by 
surrogate aspects of the problem. One of the reasons for this is that there is 
generally a great deal of uncertainty involved in these conflicts and therefore risk 
issues- can be used to motivate sectors of the community previously unconcerned. 
Real fears exist in many of these cases despite them being discounted by experts. 
Incidents such as Brown's Ferry, Three Mile Island, Bhopal and Chernobyl do not 
increase the public's faith in experts' ability to identify and control hazard. 
To date, research into the resolution of risk conflicts has not produced any 
significant breakthroughs. Research is now concentrating on risk communication 
which is assuming greater importance as technical expertise and an awareness of the 
importance of public perceptions increases. 
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8.3 The future for risk perception research 
"Risk research especially in the area of risk perceptions is 
being used as a panacea with which to address what are 
essentially societal and political matters .... 
Risk research is being used as a tool in a discourse which is 
not concerned with risks per se, nor with the cognitive 
processes by which people misperceive the risks of new 
technologies, but whose hidden agenda is the legitimising of 
decision-making institutions and the equitable distribution 
of hazards and benefits." 
(Otway and Thomas, 1982) 
We have considered the list of limitations of risk perception research as outlined by 
Covello (1983). Deriving from about the same time, Slovic et al. (1982b) suggest an 
agenda for risk perception research. It reads as follows: 
(1) what are the determinants of perceived risk? (what are the 
concepts by which people characterise risk?); 
(2) how and why do layperson's perceptions of risk differ from those 
of experts?; 
(3) what information is needed to foster enlightened individual and 
social behaviour with regard to risk issues? 
(4) what is the role of judgement in technical assessments of risk?; 
(5) how do people perceive the benefits of risky technologies?; 
(6) what determines the relative acceptability of hazardous 
technologies; and 
(7) what makes a risk analysis "acceptable"? 
Some of these questions have been addressed (notably the question as to how and 
why expert and lay perceptions vary), but very few clear answers are apparent. 
Otway and Thomas (1982) .expressed concern aboutthe reasons behind the fostering 
of risk perception research. They suggested that risk analysis (and perceived risk 
research) was being used as a political tool, and that it had little validity in its own 
right (see quote at the beginning of this section). This point of view sparked a very 
important debate as to whether perceived risk research was valid. 
Therefore, in New Zealand, we need to be very clear as to why we are studying risk 
perceptions and how they have (j.n impact on the acceptable risk process. We need 
to set our own objectives for this research. 
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O'Riordan (1982) suggests that we need to link risk perception studies more to the 
emerging critique in the wider arena of societal values and particular technologies, 
and less to the narrow area of probability consequence judgements and evaluation. 
This may be particularly important in connection with environmental risk studies 
where perceptions are closely tied with values. We need to consider ways of 
adapting processes to incorporate changes in the value structures underpinning risk 
perceptions since these alter over time. We also need to look at the influences 
effecting these changes. 
Risk perceptions are a key issue in risk conflict situations. We have already 
discussed the need for experts and decision makers to improve communication with 
lay people so that the processes by which acceptable risk decisions are made is 
transparent to the public. It is not expected that the lay public will understand the 
full technological aspects of risk analysis, but the process by which these estimates 
are derived, and the decision-making process involved with the assessment can and 
should be open and comprehensible. 
Risk communication is likely to be an important part of any future research into risk 
perceptions and acceptable risk. As stated by Slovic (1986), "the objective of 
informing and educating the public about risk issues seems easy to attain in 
principle, but in practice may be difficult to accomplish". To effectively 
communicate risk issues, analysts and communicators must have a good 
understanding of the way in which risk issues are perceived by the public and be 
prepared to modify their way of doing things to allow the public greater input into 
the decision-making process. 
Bidwell et al. (1986) suggested a five-point strategy to be adopted by decision makers 
to improve the decision-making process and make it more credible to the public. 
These were to: 
(1) emphasise outcomes; 
(2) take the initiative; 
(3) build legitimacy; 
(4) maintain credibility; and 
(5) seek consensus. 
These actions all form part of a risk management strategy and whilst some of them 
may appear difficult to implement they are important objectives for decision makers 
and managers. 
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Continuing with the theme of risk communication, Slovic (1986) makes a number of 
points, which have been arrived at through risk perception research. They are that: 
(1) people's perceptions of risk are often inaccurate; 
(2) risk information may frighten the public; 
(3) strong beliefs are hard to modify; and 
( 4) views are easily modified by presentation format. 
The implications for risk communication efforts are that risk perceptions and 
behaviour are determined not only by mortality and accident statistics, but by a 
number of other factors. Slovic (1987) further adds that "the most important 
message from this (risk perception) research is that there is wisdom as well as error 
in public attitudes and perceptions", and that by using broader criteria to judge risk 
than those used by the scientific community lay people may conceptualise risk in a 
"richer" fashion. 
This is an important conclusion for a society that is becoming increasingly concerned 
with quality of life and the maintenance of a 'quality' environment. 
Fischhoff and Lichtenstein (1982b), concluded that informing people via warning 
labels, media programmes etc. is not sufficient. What is required, is "to institute 
material into school curricula to improve people's judgmental skills and decision 
strategies for coping (with risk and uncertainty)". 
8.4 Conclusion 
This publication has described current thinking about perceived risk and acceptable 
risk, discussed the main approaches to estimating them and examined their 
usefulness within the risk decision-making process incorporating risk assessment and 
risk management. 
[n Section 4.1 we asked the question why study perceived risk? We believe that the 
main reason for this is so as to provide analysts and decision makers with 
information that can be used to improve the quality of the risk decision-making 
?rocess by clarifying and focusing public interest and concerns. Transparency of 
Jrocess is the key to the credibility of the decision-making process and hence to the 
::redibility and acceptance of the decision. 
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Scientists have in the past taken the attitude that lay perceptions of risk are due to 
ignorance and irrationality on the part of the public. Early attempts at reconciling 
lay perceptions and scientific estimates tried to bring lay perceptions closer to expert 
predictions by providing greater information to the public. This was shown to be 
counter-productive in many cases, illustrating a misunderstanding of the reasons for 
the divergence. Conflict resolution cannot in some cases be achieved because of the 
value structure of the conflict. 
Some of the reasons for divergence between expert and lay estimates of risk were 
discussed in Section 4.1. One of the key issues is that people are not concerned 
solely with mortality or physical injury. Many other (rational) factors affect their 
perceptions of risk. Therefore, expert predictions and lay perceptions are both valid 
contributors to the risk decision-making process, which includes decisions involving 
'acceptable' or 'tolerable' levels of risk. Both sides have something to contribute 
and communication is a two-way process. 
Douglas and Wildavsky (1982a) have shown that cultural influence on risk 
perceptions including the types of risk different cultures choose to study. Other 
authors including Whyte (1982) have stressed the fallacy of trying to apply results out 
of context. We must therefore be particularly careful in New Zealand not to use 
overseas results without extremely careful screening and local testing. 
People accept or reiect risk according to their perceptions. We cannot say that x is 
an acceptable risk, however, we can state that x is an acceptable level of risk for a 
particular activity and specific situation. People accept or tolerate different, 
sometimes quite high levels of risk, according to the circumstances surrounding the 
risk, their perceptions of the risk and other sociological factors. 
Perceived risk research cannot be divorced from the decision-making process. Risk 
decisions are almost always politically influenced, therefore understanding of the 
decision-making process is a critical aspect of this work. We therefore conclude by 
listing a series of conclusions rep-resenting a general consensus among risk 
researchers. 
They are that: 
(1) perceived risk is a necessary input to the risk decision-making 
process; 
(2) that in order for the public to accept the risk decision-making 
process, that process must be open and fair; 
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(3) that risk communication is a two-way affair and that channels of 
communication between analysts, decision-makers and the 
public need to be improved; and 
(4) that experts need to be more prepared to explain the processes 
by which they reach their conclusions to the public. 
Along with this, there is a feeling that although current techniques for estimating 
perceived risk are inadequate, they provide useful information and that the most 
appropriate direction for the future is to work towards developing combinations of 
current approaches which can be tested to improve the methodologies. 
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Glossary 
ACCEPTABLE RISK 
risk that is judged by society to be acceptable 
ACCEPTED RISK 
risk that is apparently accepted by society, for example, 
driving a car 
ACTUAL RISK 
HAZARD 
scientifically calculated or experienced risk (usually 
statistical risk or predicted risk) 
a harm or negative outcome 
PERCEIVED RISK 
risk as seen intuitively by individuals or societal groups 
PREDICTED RISK 
risk as measured by systems models using historical data 
REAL RISK 
RISK 
risk that will be determined by future circumstances, 
arid which therefore cannot be measured 
probability of the occurrence of harm (Freedman, 1987), 
compounded with the magnitude of the harmful event 
RISK ASSESSMENT 
risk determination and evaluation 
RISK DETERMINATION 
risk identification and estimation 
RISK ESTIMATION 
the calculation of the probability of occurrence and the 
magnitude of the possible outcomes 
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RISK EVALUATION 
the determination of the significance or value or the risk, 
including study of risk perception and the tradeoff 
between perceived risk and perceived benefits 
RISK FACTOR 
something that causes a risk (Freedman, 1987) 
RISK IDENTIFICATION 
the identification of all possible sources of risk and the 
possible outcomes from particular actions 
RISK MANAGEMENT 
SAFETY 
the making of decisions involving risk and 
implementation of these decisions 
an action is safe if its risks are judged to be acceptable 
STATISTICAL RISK 
risk measured statistically using currently available data 
UNCERTAINTY 
a lack of knowledge arising from changes that are difficult 
to predict or events whose likelihood cannot be 
accurately predicted 
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Appendix A 
Bibliographic Search 
The files searched were accessed using the DIALOG Information Retrieval Service. 
Nine specific databases were accessed. 
The initial search string used was: 
"technical" and "risktl, or 
"risktl and tlmanagementtl, or 
tlrisk" and "perception", or 
"acceptable" and "risk", or 
"perceived" and "risk", or 
"risk" and "preference", or 
"assessment" and "risk", 
In some cases very large numbers of entries were listed. When this occurred the 
search string was restricted to the perceived risk, risk perceptions and acceptable 
risk areas. In some cases, the search was limited to 1980 onwards. 
The databases searched were: 
FILE 8 COMPENDEX PLUS 
FILE 11 PSYCHOINFO 
FILE 37 SOCIOLOGICAL ABSTRACTS 
FILE 40 ENVIROLINE 
FILE 41 POLLUTION ABSTRACTS 
FILE 49 PAIS INTERNATIONAL 
FILE 68 ENVIRONMENTAL BIBLIOGRAPHY 
FILE 228 BRITISH OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS 
FILE 292 GEOBASE 
There was a considerable amount of duplication between some of the files, and the 
most useful ones were ENVIROLINE, POLLUTION ABSTRACTS and 
GEOBASE. PAIS INTERNATIONAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
BIBLIOGRAPHY were moderately useful. 
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Appendix B 
Survey design 
The next step in this project will involve testing questionnaire approaches by means 
of a series of pilot surveys. These surveys will be directed towards testing and 
developing techniques for studying and estimating perceived risk. They will also look 
at ways in which people accept and tolerate risk. 
This emphasis on techniques means that the samples used will be small and 
(probably) unrepresentative. Therefore, the results obtained may not be useful 
themselves as estimates. The objective is to compare different ways of approaching 
the question of estimating perceived risk rather than obtaining estimates to be used. 
The statistical techniques to be used will include: 
(1) psychometric scaling, following the work of Fischhoff, Slovic et 
al. of Decision Research, Eugene, Oregon; 
(2) attitude surveying, following Otway and Fishbein, IIASA, 
Austria; and 
(3) willingness-to-pay surveying (incorporating willingness-t~­
accept). 
All analysis will be performed on an IBM -style PC, using the statistical package 
SYSTAT. 
The survey techniques to be used will include telephone surveymg, personal 
interviews and mailed questionnaires. 
The areas selected for sampling will include representative communities of the 
Lyttelton Harbour Basin. There are specific environmental and ,health risks in this 
area associated with the present and proposed systems of sewerage disposal. 
It is hoped to be able to perform a retrospective study to examine current 
perceptions of either the microwave tower erected by Telecom in the lower area of 
Victoria Park on the Port Hills or the LPG pipeline and storage facility in Lyttelton. 
Accompanying this work will be a brief statement on the purpose of studying 
perceived risk, and a proposal for its use as a risk management tool. This links with 
the decision-making process study reported on in Gough (1989). 
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Appendix C 
Examples 
Although there has been a great deal of research interest in the area of perceived 
risk and acceptable risk over the past 12 years, the number of studies specifically 
aimed at obtaining estimates of perceived risk is small. This appendix contains a 
selection (non-exhaustive) of some of the more interesting studies encountered 
during this literature survey. 
Brief notes on the purpose of the studies, the way in which it was conducted, and 
some of the main conclusions reached are given. These studies will be used as a 
basis for the pilot surveys proposed for the next step in this research project. 
Slovic et al. (1985) report on three psychometric scaling studies. In these studies, 
respondents were asked to rate a set of hazards according to a range of risk 
characteristics. The primary objective of the projects was to explore the 
relationships between risk characteristics. A smaller set of characteristics was 
derived using factor analysis. These risk characteristics were related to risk 
perceptions. 
The first study was conducted over nearly three years between 1976 and 1978 and 
involved League of Women Voters (76), college students (69 and 38), Active Club 
members (47) and professional risk assessors (15) as respondents. The numbers in 
brackets refer to the numbers in each sample. In this first study the respondents 
were asked to rate perceived risk, adjusted risk and nine risk characteristics for each 
of 30 hazards. 
There were two main parts to the study. Firstly, respondents were asked to rank 
risks from different activities and secondly, they were asked to rate specific risks 
according to some of the factors (listed in Section 4.3) as affecting perceived risk. 
The two sets of information were correlated and analysed. 
The main criticism of this study was that the results obtained cannot be extrapolated 
to the general population because of the socio-economic characteristics of the 
groups used as subjects. 
The second study conducted in 1979 involved a sample of 175 college students who 
were asked to rate perceived risk, adjusted risk, desired regulation and 18 risk 
characteristics for each of 90 hazards. 
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The third study in 1980 used 34 college students who were asked to rate perceived 
risk, adjusted risk, desired regulation and 18 risk characteristics for each of 81 
hazards. 
These studies have also been reported in Fischhoff et al. (1978, 1980, 1981, 1985) 
and Slovic et aI. (1979, 1982, 1985, 1986) and other publications. The 1978 paper 
gives examples of the questions and rating scales used for the first study. 
An important conclusion reached by the authors is that "psychometric scaling can 
quantify similarities and differences among groups with respect to risk perception 
and attitudes". Non-expert judgements differed markedly from experts judgements 
where estimates of risk were concerned (however, they were similar when estimates 
of frequency of injury or death were requested). 
Although a number of different groups were studied, no attempt was made to obtain 
any sort of 'representative' sample. All groups concerned were highly educated and 
geographically centralised. The authors believe that their work, as well as providing 
a forecast of public response, provides a useful basis for comparing risks. 
These studies as reported in this paper provide a good guide for the application of 
psychometric scaling methods. 
Thomas (1981) reports on a study conducted by IIASA between 1977 and 1978. The 
survey was directed towards the choice of energy options and nuclear power in 
Austria. A stratified sample of 224 respondents was used, and people were 
questioned about their beliefs. Thirty-nine belief statements were used and 
respondents were asked to "scale their attitudes" towards five energy systems". 
Lindell and Earle (1983) describe a survey of 229 respondents in 17 different 
geographical groups across the United States. They were characterised as 
predominantly high income, highly educated males in the 30-60 age group. The 
expectation was that this sample would be politically active and express diverse 
opinions. 
A further sample of 396 respondents was selected on the basis of association with 
risk in industrial facilities. 
The purpose of this study was to determine the minimum distance respondents 
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would be prepared to live from particular industrial facilities which included oil 
fired, coal fired and nuclear power stations, oil refineries, insecticide factories and 
nuclear waste sites. 
The results of this survey were collated in the form of perceived risk gradients that 
differed by facility and social group but which were stable over time. This suggested 
that the geographical siting may be an important factor in stimulating public 
opposition to the siting of hazardous facilities (how near is near enough). 
Hohenemser et al. (1985), reported on a pilot study of 34 college educated people in 
Eugene, Oregon. Each respondent was asked to score 81 hazards on 11 hazard 
descriptors. The purpose of this study was to examine measures of 'hazardous' by 
lookIng at the way in which lay respondents view hazards. The results were 
compared with results extracted from scientific literature and discussion with 
experts. The results included a judgement of perceived risk as a ranking of the 
perceived risk of dying from each hazard on a scale of one to 100. The most striking 
conclusion was that perceived risk showed no significant correlation with mortality. 
This confirms the hypothesis that outcomes other than death are sometimes viewed 
as greater threats. The paper goes on to discuss applications of perceived risk to risk 
management. 
Macgregor and Slovic (1986) report on the evaluation of three methods for making a 
consumer product safety decision. The three methods evaluated were cost -benefit 
analysis, risk analysis and abiding by industry safety standards. The methods were 
examined for perceived acceptability, logical soundness, completeness and sensitivity 
to moral and ethical concerns. Five hundred and forty University of Oregon 
students participated in the study which was conducted in a group setting with 
presentations being make to groups of 50 respondents. Examples of questions are 
given. Factor analysis of acceptability scales and decision-making situations was 
performed. The aim of the study was to "explore a methodology for understanding 
how people evaluate decision making approaches applied in contexts involving 
health and safety risks". The results were useful and indicated that risk analysis (risk 
assessment) was the most accepted decision-making method. 
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Deluca et al. (1986) report on an explanatory model of risk perception which 
describes independent variables as socio-demographic characteristics and cognitive 
orientations affecting qualitative aspects of perceived risks and benefits, attitudes 
and information. These in turn affect the independent variables, which are 
perceived risk and perceived benefits, leading to a perception of safety standards 
and actions. 
Six technologies were studied: automobiles travel, commercial air travel, nuclear 
electric power, nuclear weapons, handguns and industrial chemicals. The sample 
included 1320 respondents from New England and the south-west USA. The 
questionnaire was conducted in interview form and took an average of 45 minutes to 
complete. At the time of writing the authors did not feel able to draw any general 
conclusions as the data was not yet fully analysed. However, they made some 
general points concerning the nature of responses of different groups. 
Full questionnaires are given. 
In 1986 Macgill conducted a study in West Cumbria which involved interviews with 
462 inhabitants. This is reported fully in Macgill (1987). The purpose ·of the study 
was to examine the effects of anxiety on the people who lived and worked in the area 
of Sellafield in West Cumbria (Windscale). 
A social survey approach was used to establish "patterns of belief'. 
The main conclusions were that the major determinants of perceptions of risk were 
material benefit, personal investment (in terms of lifestyle), workplace, malign effect 
(mythology and local beliefs), scientific understanding and the media. 
The Federal Department of Health in Canada conducted a survey of 200 people 
across Canada with the objective of ascertaining the criteria people use to evaluate 
risks, and to collect data which the Department could use to improve its 
communication with the public and to develop risk policy. The has been reported by 
Krewski et al. (1987). Respondents were asked to rate 12 activities (risk factors) on 
a one to seven scale then asked to rate the extent to which 13 characteristics 
affecting risk perception were relevant to each of the 12 factors. From the 
information obtained, risk profiles for the 12 risk factors were obtained. The main 
conclusion of this study was that people do not consider all lives to be of equal value 
or all forms of death to be equal (which counters Starr's conclusions). 
78 
Johnson and Baltensperger (1987) report on a pilot study "intended to compare the 
relative explanatory power of two personality, two bounded rationality. and three-
'social reconstruction of risk' models of hazard perceptions". Telephone interviews 
with 127 respondents were conducted, and from this sample, 47 were selected for 
face-to-face interviews. Their conclusion was that individual models were unable to 
explain the considerable variance in benefit, risk and acceptability assessments, and 
that a composite model might be required. 
McDaniels (1988) describes a contingent valuation study (expressed preference 
framework) on risk reduction where subjects expressed values were compared with 
actual and proposed costs of safety regulations. The difficulty in this case was to 
design a framework for contingent valuation which was simple for respondents to 
understand and enabled them to make intelligent responses. Four groups in 
Pittsburgh were surveyed, and 53 usable questionnaire results were obtained. The 
questions concerned willingness-to-pay (WTP) for death avoided. A second survey 
of students using an abbreviated form of the questionnaire used in the first 
survey was also performed. Three different versions of the WTP questions were 
formulated, and it was shown that the presentation of the question had a significant 
influence on the answers obtained. A further conclusions was that WTP for death 
avoided varies significantly over hazard type. 
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AppendixD 
Historical summary 
It is rather interesting to note the various stages risk perception research has gone 
through. This brief summary, written in note form, attempts to outline the main 
events that have influenced risk perception research. 
In 1969, Starr initiated the debate by looking at acceptable risk and perceived risk. 
Over the next 10 years the two main groups of Otway (IIASA, Austria) and Fischhoff 
(Decision Research, Oregon) first tried to duplicate Starr's work and then to 
develop their own methods. 
In 1973, Tversky and Kahnemann began exploring the heuristics by which 
members of the public develop their perceptions of risk. They concentrated on 
availability, representativeness and anchoring. 
In 1976, Lowrance wrote his book 'Of acceptable risk' where he discussed the 
various ways in which acceptability exists in society. He describes the types of tests 
used by statisticians to determine threshold levels for risk (levels below which no 
measurable harm can be found), and looks at regulatory practise. 
Some later authors criticised this book because of the implicit assumption it makes 
that acceptable risk exists. However, he did raise the very important questions of 
who should decide on acceptability of risk, for whom, and in what terms and why 
In 1977, Lord Rothschild made his unfortunate speech in which he attempted to 
compare accepted or tolerated risks to acceptable risk. He branded the public as 
irrational because they were apparently not prepared to accept risks attached to 
nuclear power plants at a level (mortality statistics) at which they accepted the risk of 
death from road accidents. 
Between 1975 and 1980, Otway (IIASA) and Fischhoff (DR) developed their 
approaches to estimating perceived risk. Both used the expressed preference 
approach but while Otway's group concentrated on attitude studies, Fischhoff's 
group used psychometric methods. Both groups also attempted to duplicate Starr's 
results and failed. 
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In 1981, the Royal Society discussion meeting on perceived risk was published. In 
this, Lee made the point very strongly that the public's perceptions of risk should not 
be considered irrational simply because they differ from expert predictions of risk. 
Other authors considered particular types of risk. 
In 1982 , Otway and Thomas wrote a paper in which they criticised the risk 
perception researchers (themselves included). They suggested that: 
". . . . . risk research especially in the area of risk 
perception is being used as a panacea with which to 
attempt to remedy what are essentially societal and 
political matters. Risk research is being used as a tool in 
a discourse which is not concerned with risks per se not 
with the cognitive processes by which people misperceive 
the risks of new technologies, but whose hidden agenda is 
the legitimacy of decision making institutions and the 
equitable distribution of hazards and benefits" 
(Otway and Thomas, 1982) 
This appeared in the journal Risk Research along with a paper by Slovic et al. 
in which an attempt was made to set goals for risk perception research. 
"This research (studies of risk perception) aims to aid risk 
analysis and societal decision making by (i) improving 
methods for eliciting opinions about risk, (ii) providing a 
basis for understanding and anticipating public responses 
to hazards, and (iii) improving the communication of risk 
information among laypeople, technical experts and 
policy makers." 
(Slovic, Fischhoff and Lichtenstein, 1982) 
The important thing about this debate is that it made people start to think about 
what perceived risk (and along with this) acceptable risk research was actually all 
about. They started to question whether it was important and why. 
In 1983, the Royal Society published another report on risk. This was called risk 
assessment but it dealt with perceived risk and acceptable risk and summarises the 
approaches used to date. 
An important development occurred in 1987 arising out of the Sizewell B enquiry in 
Britain. 
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Sir Frank Layfield QC commented that "although acceptable risk is often used in 
balancing risks and benefits, it does not adequately convey the reluctance with which 
possible substantial risks and benefits may be tolerated". 
O'Riordan (1987) pursued this line and suggests that this tolerance rests on 4 basic 
principles 
(1) ignorance - which risks are known and which are not; 
(2) de Minimis principle - residual dangers will be tolerated if there 
is no better approach and if the process through which this is 
accepted is transparent, accessible and accountable; 
(3) the comparison test - dangers are tolerated if seen to be lower 
than other familiar processes; and 
(4) the justification test - where the benefits are related directly to 
the possible dangers. 
This approach, which requires acceptance of some form of regulatory agency, could 
be pursued. 
This brief summary ignores a lot of the major work done in the area, but illustrates 
some of the important points. It must be remembered that a lot of other risk 
researchers with related interests have contributed to the perceived risk and 
acceptable risk debates. 
The current 'hot' issue in risk research appears to be in the area of risk 
communication, and this research will undoubtably proceed further in the area of 
risk conflicts. Developments will be reported in future Centre for Resource 
Management reports and publications. 
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